HOLYROOD INQUIRY TRANSCRIPT

 

Tuesday 25 November 2003 (Afternoon Session)

 

Hearing resumed at 2.15 pm

 

1.      Mr Campbell QC:  Sir, Dr Gibbons has kindly returned to give evidence to the Inquiry following his long session yesterday.  I am much obliged, Dr Gibbons, thank you.  Once again, could I say that if you are feeling under any pressure or want a break, then please say so.

 

2.      I wonder if I could deal with two or three things which are not immediately obviously connected with one another, just to get them out of the way.  Could you please look first of all at SE/2/277?  This is a minute from the Chief Executive of Historic Scotland, Mr Munro, to Mr Gordon, dated September 1997, which you are copied into, as you will see.

 

3.      The thrust of it is that Mr Munro is complaining to Mr Gordon about the way in which Historic Scotland’s views have been represented in the press, or at least by Jones Lang Wootton.  You see all that in the first paragraph.  You will see a reference in the first paragraph to the views of a senior Scottish Office civil servant.  I have not so far managed to identify who that might be, but I wonder if you recognise it as a description of yourself?  I am not saying it is you or not.

 

4.      Dr Gibbons:  No, I do not recognise it as a description of myself.

 

5.      Mr Campbell QC:  Do you remember this memo?

 

6.      Dr Gibbons:  Absolutely, yes.

 

7.      Mr Campbell QC:  We can see that Mr Munro sets out — quite trenchantly, I think, for a civil servant — his views about what is being said about Historic Scotland.  Do you recall whether any action followed this minute?

 

8.      Dr Gibbons:  I think there was internal concern amongst the members of the Steering Group, if I can describe them like that — Robert Gordon, Paul Grice and myself — because I do not think any of us recognised ourselves in that description.  The way that we were trying to deal with the concerns of Historic Scotland, as well as the concerns of the Secretary of State, were complex and were difficult, but I do not think anybody, as it were, was setting out to provide misinformation about the views of Historic Scotland.

 

9.      Mr Campbell QC:  This letter predates, of course, the revelation that Holyrood might be available as a site.  As time went on through 1998, how did you view Historic Scotland — as a part of a team, or as an impediment, really, to progress?

 

10.  Dr Gibbons:  No, the only aspect of Historic Scotland which was a marginal impediment to progress was they are made up of so many different parts, which can each have slightly different views, each with different responsibilities, so we were at times talking to their architects — experts in technology, if you like — and at times with the Inspectorate, who tended to be more expert in basic matters of listing the basic historical aspects of the building.  At times, these views, to the outsider, appeared not to coincide, but usually, Mr Munro was the point at which they were brought together.

 

11.  Mr Campbell QC:  All right, that disposes of that point.  Now, quite unconnected with it, yesterday I interrupted you in the middle of an answer towards the end of the day.  My apologies for doing that.  You were explaining to me that you thought it might be beneficial to listen to the views of other panel members on the point I was discussing with you — I forget what it was — and I interrupted you because I thought you were giving me an answer which referred to other competitions.  Could I just clarify that the misunderstanding is mine and not yours.  It was not intended that I should cut you off at the pass.

 

12.  The third thing, before we move on, is that I put it to you yesterday that you were absent from the office in the early part of 1998.  I should have said 1999.  Was it in fact 1999, or both?

 

13.  Dr Gibbons:  Both is true, but for different lengths of time.  In 1998, it was for a month between mid-January and mid-February.  In 1999 I think it was for the best part of three months around the same period of the year.

 

14.  Mr Campbell QC:  And the fourth thing I would like to cover with you before we move back into the substance of what we were discussing yesterday was that is it correct that you lived in Crichton House, Pathhead from July 1981?

 

15.  Dr Gibbons:  From before then.  I think I have lived there since December 1978.

 

16.  Mr Campbell QC:  Thank you, that is helpful.  Did you between 1986 and 1989 have as a neighbour Mr Brian Stewart?

 

17.  Dr Gibbons:  I am not sure of the precise dates, but for about three years Brian Stewart was a neighbour, yes.

 

18.  Mr Campbell QC:  And it would therefore be a period of eight years and about four months after Mr Stewart left Pathhead before the May 1997 General Election?

 

19.  Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

20.  Mr Campbell QC:  Have you remained acquainted over that period?

 

21.  Dr Gibbons:  Well, our work brings us together quite a lot, in terms of professional activity, yes.  Particularly since the start of the Parliament, the feasibility studies certainly brought me into contact with Mr Stewart, although the feasibility studies were mainly led by Mr Duncan, but I have remained professionally in touch.  We certainly usually see each other at professional events.

 

22.  Mr Campbell QC:  It is only right that I give you the opportunity to comment on the appearance of the fact that you were neighbours at a period.  Do you have anything else you want to say about that?

 

23.  Dr Gibbons:  We were just neighbours.  I can certainly speak for myself.  We had no other relationship than being neighbours.  There have been allegations that we have shared family holidays, which are totally untrue.  I cannot recall really ever in the three-year period when Brian Stewart and family lived next door an occasion when we went out together in a social sense.

 

24.  Mr Campbell QC:  And, as I say, it was more than eight years after he left Creighton House that in May 1997 the election took place.

 

25.  Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

26.  Mr Campbell QC:  Thank you for that.  Now, can we go back to where we were yesterday and consider the issue of the organisation of the designer competition, which perhaps you know we have been discussing this morning with two of the panel members Professor MacMillan and Miss O’Connor?

 

27.  I think you told me yesterday that you had regard to existing guidance published by the Department of Natural Heritage and the Department of the Environment in England and Wales, and that formed, as it were, the foundation for the recommendations you made to the Secretary of State.

 

28.  Could I look with you please, first of all, at RI/1/049 ?.  That is Mr Tombs, the secretary of the RIAS [Royal Incorporation of Architects in Scotland], writing to the Secretary of State, welcoming the announcement of Holyrood, and then RI/1/050 is, I think, a minute of the meeting with the RIAS at which you were present.  Is that right?

 

29.  Dr Gibbons:  That is correct.

 

30.  Mr Campbell QC:  What was the purpose of that meeting?

 

31.  Dr Gibbons:  It was to explain to the RIAS and to the Royal Fine Art Commission the approach that we were developing towards the competition, because there had been general debate about the form that the competition might take, and there had been correspondence with the RIAS.  In fact, I think we were aware that the RIAS wished to run the competition, but I think their view was that it would be most appropriate to have either an open design competition or a limited design competition.

 

32.  Mr Campbell QC:  Rather than a competition for a designer?

 

33.  Dr Gibbons:  That is right, yes.  And so, the Secretary of State felt that a face-to-face meeting following correspondence, was a way of airing our position and giving them the opportunity to make their position very clear.

 

34.  Mr Campbell QC:  Was your position at one with theirs in relation to the type of competition that you wanted?

 

35.  Dr Gibbons:  Prior to the discussions that we had had, we were moving towards the designer competition for the reasons which we discussed yesterday, really — that it was within the rules, as we understood them, and it offered certain aspects of a competition which were attractive to the Secretary of State: more client control of the process; it offered the benefits of speed of the competition and being able to work with a design team earlier than one would normally have been able to work.

 

36.  Mr Campbell QC:  So, can we sum those three up, just for the notes.  Control, speed and interlocking with the designer more quickly?

 

37.  Dr Gibbons:  Yes, and, to a degree, two aspects of cost.  One was cost to the department in organising the competition.  It was a cheaper route to organise.  But the other, which concerned the Secretary of State for other reasons, was what appeared to him to be very abortive costs that the profession at large would bear if they entered a design competition.  It is not unusual for practices to spend up to £250,000 on their entry for a design competition.

 

38.  The designer competition was, really, very much under the direction of the Secretary of State, designed to be as economical as possible to enter.

 

39.  Mr Campbell QC:  Yes, I think we have the Secretary of State recorded somewhere as saying he did not want to see people wasting money or spending a lot of money by coming into a competition.

 

40.  Equally, he was looking for the cream of Europe’s designers, so it seems that he is slightly wanting his cake and eating it.

 

41.  Dr Gibbons:  I think that is possibly true.  I think we all want our cake and to eat it as well.  Ministers with other hats on were hearing very regularly about these abortive costs, and there was considerable pressure that Government might move in some way to cover the abortive costs.

 

42.  Mr Campbell QC:  Was it ever in your contemplation that you would outsource the whole business of the competition to “the professionals” to let the professional bodies deal with it for you?

 

43.  Dr Gibbons:  The starting point was that, yes.

 

44.  Mr Campbell QC:  And your confidence in the RIAS, was it maintained, or did it fall away?

 

45.  Dr Gibbons:  It fell away.

 

46.  Mr Campbell QC:  Why?

 

47.  Dr Gibbons:  It fell away in terms of what we perceived to be the service that they were offering.  We carried it forward in two ways.  We had discussions with the RIAS and we had discussions with the RIBA.  The discussions with the RIBA were very fruitful, and they demonstrated really a great understanding of us as a client, in a sense, and what we were looking for.

 

48.  There was a general concern — not just mine, because I was not the only person involved in the dialogue with the RIAS — that they actually understood what we were looking for.

 

49.  Mr Campbell QC:  There was a concern that they did not understand what you were looking for?

 

50.  Dr Gibbons:  That they did not understand what we were looking for.  I think the concern was that they were still anxious to pursue a design competition.  Sub-arguments were advanced about restricting the competition to the architectural profession in Scotland, which we could not.  I think this minute actually records that — that there was a debate about why that could not happen.

 

51.  Mr Campbell QC:  You say we could not do that.  Was that because of the procurement rule or for some other reason?

 

52.  Dr Gibbons:  Well, essentially procurement rules, but the underriding objective in terms of the building by that time was that the Secretary of State saw no reason why we could not interest the best architects in the world to be employed on what he considered to be one of the most important buildings in Scotland.  So we were looking for the best.

 

53.  Mr Campbell QC:  Could I look at paragraph 5, please on the next page, RI/1/051?  You are quoted there as saying that there could be a problem with such a route, and we have to look back to see what such a route is, maintaining a more open access to the process rather than a closed or limited one.  Then you expressed a desire to avoid a large number of firms, a point Donald Dewar reinforced.  That is really the very point you have just been making, is it not?

 

54.  Dr Gibbons:  It is, yes.

 

55.  Mr Campbell QC:  I would like to ask you one more question about this minute, since it does not appear in any Scottish Executive document that I have been able to find.  It is at paragraph 23, page RI/1/053:

 

56.    “John Gibbons, reverting to selection processes, expressed the view that there were problems with foreign-name architects forming local marriages with practices.”

 

57.  What did you have in mind, Dr Gibbons?

 

58.  Dr Gibbons:  Well, the first thing to say is that this is, as you know, not a minute of the Scottish Executive.  This is an RIAS produced minute, and so we never cleared the terminology or the wording that was used here.  I think this is a little confusing.  What I was actually talking about at that point in time, I think, is the difficulties of joint venture practices.

 

59.  I think, by that time, there was a recognition, particularly, again, from the desk appraisal of architectural schemes that we had looked at, that very often joint venture architects came together — that there was an executive architect and a concept architect.  Clearly, if you are making a marriage between practices from different backgrounds, different working cultures, different environments, that that is something that should be carefully looked at.

 

60.  Mr Campbell QC:  Yes but, with respect, that is no more than a statement of the obvious.  Is this not something more that you have in mind here?

 

61.  Dr Gibbons:  Not that I can recall.

 

62.  Mr Campbell QC:  All right.  You were asked, I think, at paragraph 31, page RI/1/054, to go away and work up a paper.  Was that in relation to the competition process?

 

63.  Dr Gibbons:  Yes, as far as I can recall.

 

64.  Mr Campbell QC:  And was that for a submission to the Secretary of State about the type of competition which should be held?

 

65.  Dr Gibbons:  No, I think it was for further discussion within the Scottish Parliament Steering Group.

 

66.  Mr Campbell QC:  About what?

 

67.  Dr Gibbons:  About the organisation of the competition.

 

68.  Mr Campbell QC:  In other words, whether it was to be design or designer, or more specific?

 

69.  Dr Gibbons:  And how it was to be done.  I think by that time — certainly internally in the Scottish Office — the view formed almost immediately, I think from memory, on the evening of this meeting, was that we would go ahead with the designer competition in principle, and I was to work up a paper looking at it in more detail with colleagues in the Steering Group.

 

2.30 pm

 

70.  Mr Campbell QC:  The Secretary of State issued a press release on 26 January, SE/3/029, at which he announced a competition for architects throughout Scotland, Britain and Europe for the opportunity to bid, welcoming interests from design teams with ideas for designing the Parliament building and expressing confidence in the process.  It would appear that, by this date, a decision had been taken to run a designer competition.  Do you agree with that?

 

71.  Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

72.  Mr Campbell QC:  And we know, do we not, that the OJEC notice was sent out on about 23 January 1997.  So the die was cast then in terms of the type of competition that was to be procured.

 

73.  Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

74.  Mr Campbell QC:  I wonder if you could look at SE/3/039, please.  This is a minute from a Mr Eric Kinsey, who we have not heard of before in this Inquiry, but I think now works on the Parliament site.

 

75.  Dr Gibbons:  He still works on the Parliament site.

 

76.  Mr Campbell QC:  Who is Mr Kinsey?

 

77.  Dr Gibbons:  Mr Kinsey is a member of the Holyrood Project Team, and has been employed in various capacities since 1997, that I recall, in an administrative capacity within the team.

 

78.  Mr Campbell QC:  We will see his signature at the foot of the page in a moment.  I would like to look the question, or the point, that he makes, please, on question 1(a). 

 

79.    “On question 1a, we have decided that details on how a team would be legally formed will be requested at a later stage in the process.”

 

80.  Now, question 1(a) in the PQQ, Dr Gibbons, is simply “give the name of your firm.  “It simply says “Name of firm”.  Now, what was under discussion here about the formation of a team?

 

81.  Dr Gibbons:  I think it was anticipating that, in fact, there may be teams, architects that would come forward that were not at the outset having a legal arrangement between them — the common, the concept architect, the executive architect — and the Scottish Office has had before this date several projects where they had experience of that, and I can think that that was the only reason that we were taking advice on that.

 

82.  Mr Campbell QC:  Could this be a reference to — we might have to ask Mr Kinsey about this — but could this be a reference to either a team of architects, a pairing of architects or perhaps a team led by an architect, including engineers and quantity surveyors?

 

83.  Dr Gibbons:  No, I think it is the relationship between looking at the possibility of having two architects, not the arrangements.  The basis of how the rest of the team would be formed had been, I think, established much earlier, that although we would look to the lead consultant to put forward the membership of the team on the basis that the lead consultant would then be putting forward sub-consultants or other consultants with which he could work, which would lead to a better amalgamated team.  But nevertheless, at the end of the day, the client would enter into a direct contractual arrangement with each member.  The difficulty really was how we would deal with a joint venture company or two architects that came together, and that is what we had relatively recent experience of.

 

84.  Mr Campbell QC:  Where did you have that experience?

 

85.  Dr Gibbons:  The Royal Scottish Academy of Music and Drama directly, where we had a concept architect and an executive architect. 

 

86.  Mr Campbell QC:  I do not think that has been an entirely happy tale, has it?  In the sense that it has had a long tail of litigation since it was finished.

 

87.  Dr Gibbons:  Yes, it is a complex story, but there were a number of difficulties in that marriage of architects which, I think, the preparatory work in setting the Commission up did not adequately anticipate those difficulties, and this was really an attempt to say “Well, we must learn from these experiences”.  And that led us to the proposal that we did not want to work with two separate firms of architects, and we wanted to ensure that if the proposition was put to us, of two architects, we would make sure that they themselves came together to form a unified company and that we would only deal with the unified company.

 

88.  Mr Campbell QC:  And if this were to involve a change in the identity of a competitor in the course of the process, would that matter?

 

89.  Dr Gibbons:  It was not seen to, I mean, we did not address the specifics, but it was not picked up at that time that that would ever present any problems.

 

90.  Mr Campbell QC:  It is a matter I am going to come to, but perhaps we can just talk round it just now, since we are there.  Can you look at in this way, which is another way of looking at it? 

 

91.  Competitor A enters a competition under his own name — let us call him John Gibbons — and he gives certain information about his practice, which is effective to procure his shortlisting in a competition.  Competitor A then realises that, in order to achieve success in the competition, he will need to make use of outside resources.  So he engages in an informal way with somebody we will call Competitor B, and they go forward to the last stage in a transformed identity, who we will call Competitor C.

 

92.  Now the panel then is dealing at the first stage with Competitor A alone, and has, if you like, got Competitor A past the first stage.  By the time we get to stage three, we have got a different animal — different identity, different legal structure, for all we know different shareholdings, different financial arrangements, different personnel and whatnot.

 

93.  I would like to know what your evidence is as to that scenario.  Does it matter that by the time the panel gets to the end stage it is dealing with a different creature?

 

94.  Dr Gibbons:  I think the view that was taken as it progressed, as I said, we did not anticipate that this is a problem.  It developed as we went along, and I think the view that was taken was that, provided the bringing together of the consultants in some way improved the situation and addressed concerns that had been expressed, then the panel was content that that should happen.  So it was rather taken to the panel discussion.

 

95.  Mr Campbell QC:  Try looking at it from the point of view of an unsuccessful first-stage competitor, who competes in his own name and is inhibited from teaming up with somebody else because he realises that to do so would change his identity.  Might he not feel aggrieved that Competitor A and Competitor B have got through, whereas he, being more modest about teaming up, had not got through?

 

96.  Dr Gibbons:  He might feel aggrieved, but there was very public encouragement to smaller practices to join with larger practices.  In one of the Secretary of State’s press releases that is made very clear.

 

97.  Mr Campbell QC:  I think, with respect, though that was before the competition began.  The whole thrust of my question —

 

98.  Dr Gibbons:  Yes, it was.

 

99.  Mr Campbell QC:  — this was a change in the identity.  Perhaps we should stop talking theoretically and talk practically.  Enric Miralles presented, in the first instance, on his own with his own practice’s information.  By the time we got to the final interviews in June he had teamed up with RMJM, formed a new company, about which we know very little — or you knew very little, as members of the design panel — because there had not been a PQQ for this finalist competitor, had there?

 

100.          Dr Gibbons:  No.  We by then had, if you like, a much greater knowledge of the two separate halves of the new company.  It was not just Enric Miralles and RMJM, of course, it was Rafael Vinoly and Reiach and Hall.  Both came to us with the same proposition, which is the messages that they had taken from the first-stage interview with great concern about their capacity to build the building here from a distance, and both put forward the same proposition which is they would like to enter into partnership with a local practice rather than develop their own base here.

 

101.          Mr Campbell QC:  Do you have any concern at all about the identity of a competitor changing in the course of a competition?

 

102.          Dr Gibbons:  I think it depends on the circumstances, and in the circumstances that we faced I did not have a concern at the time and none of the panel members had a concern.  They all saw it as a very positive benefit.

 

103.          Mr Campbell QC:  You went to Barcelona with Prof MacMillan for the express purpose of seeing Enric Miralles.  Is that right?

 

104.          Dr Gibbons:  And his work, yes.

 

105.          Mr Campbell QC:  Well, of course, and his work and his studio and so forth.

 

106.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

107.          Mr Campbell QC:  And that was, if I understand the evidence correctly, after the reduction of the long list of 70 to 12 shortlisted competitors.

 

108.          Dr Gibbons:  That is correct, yes.

 

109.          Mr Campbell QC:  That is correct, is it not?

 

110.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

111.          Mr Campbell QC:  And when you met with him in Barcelona he was still a competitor on his own?  That is correct?

 

112.          Dr Gibbons:  That is correct, yes.

 

113.          Mr Campbell QC:  Did you have discussions with him in Barcelona about the possibility of teaming up with a Scottish partner?

 

114.          Dr Gibbons:  He put that as a possibility to us at a meeting, I think, on the first evening that we arrived, in his office in his house, mainly in the sense that he threw a file across the table and said “I have these letters from many Scottish architects, both congratulating me, but also I think more interested in working with me.”  I cannot remember the words, but “What do you think?”  That was the way that it came up.

 

115.          Mr Campbell QC:  And did you look through them?

 

116.          Dr Gibbons:  I did not look through them.  He mentioned several names that were in the list… four I think, four names, and they were a sufficient range to sort of say — I remember it prompted me to say “We would not wish to get involved in directing you to any particular firm, but we would certainly not wish you to do anything until you sought our views on the firm that you had chosen, if you want to go down that route.”  I think, from memory, I do not know if we indicated whether we were supportive or not supportive.

 

117.          Mr Campbell QC:  So you would not give him a steer, but you did not want him to proceed until he had tied up a relationship?

 

118.          Dr Gibbons:  The steer we gave him, yes, was that we would first of all want him to form one company with whichever company, if he chose to.  I have to say that he, in turn, was giving us evidence that he did this in other places.  The Utrecht Parliament has exactly that arrangement.

 

119.          Mr Campbell QC:  I am just trying to find the facts out, you understand.

 

120.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.  I think the main thing I communicated at that pre-meeting was if you want to consider working with anybody else we do not want to have to face a concept architect and an executive architect.  We want one unified company which we could deal with, and we do not want you to enter into any arrangement that we have not said we are happy with.  I think that was brought about because, of the four firms that he mentioned by name, certainly one I would have had great concerns about him joining forces with.

 

121.          Mr Campbell QC:  From your knowledge of the profession?

 

122.          Dr Gibbons:  From my knowledge of the profession.  And one other, from the knowledge of the overall performance of that practice, but the other was from what I would call the design standards of that practice, the track record they had of producing the sort of architecture that I felt by that stage we were looking for. 

 

123.          But I did not put that back to him as specifics but as generality.

 

124.          Mr Campbell QC:  Did Señor Miralles ask you for a view about any of the people who had written the letters which were in the file?

 

125.          Dr Gibbons: He tried to.

 

126.          Mr Campbell QC:  Did you give him a view?

 

127.          Dr Gibbons: No.

 

128.          Mr Campbell QC:  Even negatively. What about so and so? What do you think of that?

 

2.45 pm

 

129.          Dr Gibbons: No, the negative view was — well I hope which is the message that he took, which is that we would be quite discerning ourselves. We would not rush; we would not support anything he put forward, that he was within his… We felt we wanted to make sure that he was selecting if he wanted to work with a partner, the partner. And we would not want to enter into that arrangement but we would want to satisfy ourselves that it would work at the end of the day.

 

130.          Mr Campbell QC:  But it would be a nod as good as a wink, would it not, if a name was mentioned and you did not demur from that particular name?

 

131.          Dr Gibbons: Well, I do not think so. As I say, he rattled through more names — I can remember four but … No, I think the nod is as good as a wink applies in the sense I think we, by not saying no to that proposition, “we only want you” and particularly in the context that he was explaining about how he worked in Barcelona as a design architect with other executive architects, how he worked in Utrecht with a local Dutch firm of architects building the Parliament. It seemed to me he was very familiar with working with other practices in constructing projects for a variety of reasons in Utrecht for just simple geographical reasons, but in other places because he used executive architects in the sense there were larger offices with bigger drawing staff to draw on. He seemed to be very familiar with all of that.

 

132.          Mr Campbell QC: This all took place in the month of May 1998, I think.

 

133.          Dr Gibbons: Yes.

 

134.          Mr Campbell QC:  Between the two interviews?

 

135.          Dr Gibbons: I think, yes, it was the last day of April probably.

 

136.          Mr Campbell QC: Was it part of a systematic approach to each of the 12 finalists?

 

137.          Dr Gibbons: As far as we could; as far as we were able. Everybody had different sort of time priorities. Part of the architectural competitions guidelines was an encouragement to visit offices and visit buildings; and whenever possible within the team we visited all 12 practices.

 

138.          Mr Campbell QC:  And yourself? You visited them all, did you?

 

139.          Dr Gibbons: No, no. I said within the team we visited them. I visited the Norwegian practice; I visited Enric Miralles’s practice; Barbara Doig visited the Groep practice in Brussels.  That is how we approached it. Joan O’Connor visited buildings in Japan that had been produced by Denton Corker Marshall and Glass Murray. I visited the Glass Murray offices in Glasgow at a time when the Australian partner actually was there because they were quite clear how they were going to do it. Denton Corker Marshall were basing themselves in Glass Murray’s office in Glasgow. Reiach and Hall were the same with Rafael Vinoly; we did not visit Rafael Vinoly but we had discussions with Reiach and Hall about how they were going to work with, you know, so I —

 

140.          Mr Campbell QC:  Excuse me. Did you visit the offices of Michael Wilford?

 

141.          Dr Gibbons: From memory, we did not visit the office. What we did with Michael Wilford was we visited the offices of Burö Happold, which was not just a visit to see the Happold office in the sense of the relationship with Michael Wilford. Michael Wilford had put forward Burö Happold within his team, as had several others. Because of the timescale and the difficulties of trying to do a lot of things in a short period of time, we visited the Burö Happold office in Bath basically with two intentions. One was to discuss with Burö Happold and with Michael Wilford who — I think Laurence Bain from Burö Happold attended that meeting — and we wanted to discuss with them the particular proposal that involved them. But with the managing director of Burö Happold who — I have forgotten his name — we wanted to discuss how Burö Happold intended to support so many teams. A very big organisation but —

 

142.          Mr Campbell QC:  But clearly there would only be one winner, so that they would not have to support a number of teams, would they?

 

143.          Dr Gibbons: I was more worried about the process that was going to lead them to submission because for example engineers working closely with architects would be in a position where they could potentially share information. What we were assured by Burö Happold was that they already had put in place a Chinese wall situation. So they were a very large company, and so they found it quite easy to allocate partners to particular architectural practices that were putting forward submissions.

 

144.          Mr Campbell QC: So you visited Burö Happold and Michael Wilford at Burö Happold’s offices?

 

145.          Dr Gibbons: Yes.

 

146.          Mr Campbell QC:  In Bath, I think.

 

147.          Dr Gibbons: In Bath, yes.

 

148.          Mr Campbell QC: Was that with Mrs Doig?

 

149.          Dr Gibbons: With Mrs Doig, yes.

 

150.          Mr Campbell QC:  And your concern there was not to look at Michael Wilford and Partners as a prospective candidate but to look at the engineering arrangements of Burö Happold?

 

151.          Dr Gibbons: No, it was both, because Burö Happold were also putting forward interesting ideas of environmental engineering within their buildings.

 

152.          Mr Campbell QC:  And you did not go to Michael Wilford’s office at all?

 

153.          Dr Gibbons: Not in London, no.

 

154.          Mr Campbell QC:  Did you place any emphasis when you were there on the issues of speed and delivery of the building?

 

155.          Dr Gibbons: Yes.

 

156.          Mr Campbell QC:  What was the message that you were giving?

 

157.          Dr Gibbons: Well, I cannot remember them in detail but this was one key messages that we took to all the offices that we went to, which was the broad timeframe that we were working with and to try to tease out from them their experience of essentially fast-track construction.

 

158.          Mr Campbell QC:  Had you in mind by that time the vehicle that you would use to try to procure fast-track construction, the contract vehicle?

 

159.          Dr Gibbons: Only to the degree that it was probably not going to be traditional.

 

160.          Mr Campbell QC: Were you familiar with the expression “construction management” or “construction management route”?

 

161.          Dr Gibbons: It was beginning to become a method that was being used, yes.

 

162.          Mr Campbell QC: Would you consider that you had taken a decision about construction management?

 

163.          Dr Gibbons: Oh, absolutely not. I think at that point in time what was in my mind I suppose was management contracting, which was the most relevant fast-track experience that we had. So this was moving from that position. That was on the basis of Victoria Quay and the Museum of Scotland which was —

 

164.          Mr Campbell QC:  Which were both recent experiences.

 

165.          Dr Gibbons: Recent experiences, and I was on the client panel of the Museum of Scotland so I had an ongoing involvement with the Museum of Scotland. I knew in great detail what was going on. Management contracting appeared to be working quite well there. So that was my experience at that point in time of fast-track construction. Mr Armstrong brought considerably more experience to the pool of knowledge with his understanding of construction management.

 

166.          Mr Campbell QC: And management contracting also was used at Victoria Quay, I think.

 

167.          Dr Gibbons: Yes.

 

168.          Mr Campbell QC: So you had experience of that?

 

169.          Dr Gibbons: Yes.

 

170.          Mr Campbell QC: But that is to be distinguished from the construction management route which is employed at the Scottish Parliament?

 

171.          Dr Gibbons: Yes.

 

172.          Mr Campbell QC: Did you ascertain, when in Barcelona, whether Enric Miralles had worked using construction management techniques?

 

173.          Dr Gibbons: We discussed in general terms construction techniques and what he was using, particularly in Utrecht, which was the nearest example that we had; and although it appeared to be a deviant of management contracting, he seemed to understand what we were talking about with fast-track construction.

 

174.          Mr Campbell QC: But you did not explore it in technical detail, did you?

 

175.          Dr Gibbons: Not in technical detail, but at the subsequent interviews we explored with every architect those aspects of how to deliver.

 

176.          Mr Campbell QC: How much of a political priority was the speedy construction of the Parliament for the Secretary of State?

 

177.          Dr Gibbons: I think it was quite important. I mean, one always felt there was both pressure to start building and pressure to deliver quickly. From a professional point of view, that also made sense. The view at the time was certainly the chances of securing the best value for money was to look towards a limited period of time, a fast-track sort of approach, not to take too long to build.

 

178.          Mr Campbell QC: Can I just try to understand that and see what the competing priorities are? Are you saying that you perceived there to be a short route to a value for money completed building by using what you call fast-track construction?

 

179.          Dr Gibbons: Yes, the cumulative knowledge that we were gaining from talking to others, from quantity surveyors and what we gleaned from talking to all the teams at interview, was that there were considerable advantages for building quickly; that particularly with innovative methods of procurement where management contracting and more importantly construction management, you are spending money every month, which we are finding, just to maintain the presence of a contractor on site. So the advice that we were getting was to set the tightest possible timescale. I think, at times, thinking of the Parliament anyway, Holyrood, we were talking about no more than a 21- to 24-month period of time for £50 million worth of building.

 

180.          Mr Campbell QC: But of course, well, we know it was not £50 million because by the time we got to the designer competition, those figures were well behind us. But the essential predicate of that equation, which you have just sketched out for me, is that you know what you are building; and if it is not designed yet, then is there not a forced pulling in the other direction, which is you have got contractors on site, you have got packages let, but they do not actually know quite what they are building until they are fully on site?

 

181.          Dr Gibbons: Well, I think they need to know enough about the stage that is in front of them. We realised straightaway that in the timescale there is not enough leading time to have the building fully designed, but it needs to be designed to a state where you are not having to revisit any of the fundamental problems. I mean, to try to avoid problems that certainly, and particularly in competition design, have occurred elsewhere.

 

182.          The major problems of cost with the Sydney Opera House were the fact that the foundations were designed and being built before the superstructure was designed. So we saw ways of avoiding that through construction management; and that is effectively what sort of happened in terms of the overall design of the building, if you like. The footprint of all the various parts were designed at an early stage, which allowed the foundations to start, knowing that what was going above was going to fit on those foundations.

 

183.          Mr Campbell QC: But it has not worked, has it, because the project has gone on to 2003 and they are still continuing?

 

184.          Dr Gibbons: Well, there is a whole variety of reasons why that is the case; it has not been just down to not being completely designed at the start.

 

185.          Mr Campbell QC: Very well. When you met with Michael Wilford and Partners in Bath, did you make it clear to them that speed was, as far as you were concerned, of the essence?

 

186.          Dr Gibbons: That it was important, yes.

 

187.          Mr Campbell QC:  Did you speculate or think ahead to the political dimension which might emerge if the building was not completed in tune with the Secretary of State’s demands? For example, consequences for the next election.

 

188.          Dr Gibbons: To a degree, yes.

 

189.          Mr Campbell QC: In what way?

 

190.          Dr Gibbons: Well, I think we were concerned that with the knowledge that there was going to be a change of client and therefore possibly changes to the requirements that we had to drive home the importance of avoiding change at all costs. These were messages which were sent out loud and clear at that period of time.

 

191.          Mr Campbell QC: By change of client, you mean a change from the Scottish Office to the Parliament?

 

192.          Dr Gibbons: Yes.

 

193.          Mr Campbell QC: And was it not inescapably within your knowledge that when that happened it was likely that there would be a change in the requirements for the configuration of the building?

 

194.          Dr Gibbons:  It was a possibility that we argued strenuously should not be allowed to happen.

 

195.          Mr Campbell QC: Forgive me, but having handed it over, you were really putting it out of your own hands, were you not?

 

196.          Dr Gibbons: The Scottish Office was putting it out of its hands, yes.

 

197.          Mr Campbell QC: So the Scottish Office, which was going out of business with the introduction of the Scotland Act, had been replaced by the new Scottish Executive, was at the same time passing over to the Parliamentary Corporate Body the building project?

 

198.          Dr Gibbons: Yes.

 

199.          Mr Campbell QC: Now, we will come on another occasion to what the state of the project was at that time. My question was really directed to this:  was it not likely that when that happened — because you knew it was going to happen — that there would be a probable change in the building requirements because the parliamentarians would start to look at the matter for themselves?

 

200.          Dr Gibbons: Well, I think that was unknown at the time. From a professional point of view we argued for great restraint or great awareness that any change in the requirements would bring about additional costs and programme delays.

 

201.          Mr Campbell QC:  But after July 1999, the Parliament could turn its back on that, could it not, and deal with it in its own way?

 

202.          Dr Gibbons:  It could indeed.  But the project team were being transferred with the Parliament building, and the project team were... That was a view which they understood and would continue to pursue. 

 

203.          Mr Campbell QC:  But they had, with respect, professional responsibility for what they were taking with them to the Parliament but not ultimately the power to dictate what should or should not change. 

 

204.          Dr Gibbons:  That was the will of the Parliament. 

 

205.          Mr Campbell QC:  Could we look please at a minute of 27 January 1998 from Mr Grice to the Private Secretary and others, SE/3/013?  I have rather gone off the track of the competition, Dr Gibbons, I am sorry.  If I can come back to that.  This is Mr Grice writing about the procedure to select an architectural design team, as you can see.  For some reason, you are not included here in the copy list.  You may have been away; it may not be important.

 

3.00 pm

 

206.          Could I look at the next page, SE/3/014?  I will ask Mr Grice about these things.  In that paragraph 3

 

207.“The Royal Fine Art Commission were generally content with the proposed way forward.  The Royal Incorporation would clearly prefer an open design competition but appeared to be prepared to go along with the proposals, provided they were they given their place.”

 

208.          What are we to understand by that term?

 

209.          Dr Gibbons:  I was in Australia. You are right; I was not in Scotland at that point.  But my understanding of what was happening at that point in time was that there was a dialogue continuing between the President of the Royal Incorporation of Architects in Scotland and the Secretary of the Royal Incorporation of Architects in Scotland and Paul Grice about how the RIAS would continue to support the design competition.  He was discussing and trying to find a way with them for them to be involved.  That is my understanding. 

 

210.          Mr Campbell QC:  Could we turn to page 16 (SE/3/016) in this sequence, paragraph 12?  Mr Grice says:

 

211.          “There are no strict rules about the composition of the panel.  We envisage between five and seven.  We suggest the group should be chaired by Mr McLeish.  .We also suggest John Gibbons and Robert Gordon from the Scottish Office.” 

 

212.          Which is indeed what happened.  Paragraph 13 says:

 

213.“If Ministers agree, that leaves up to a further three places.  If we want to be sure of having a majority……  that would mean having another Scottish Office person on the panel.”

 

214.          What am I to take from that expression “If we want to be sure of having a majority,”? 

 

215.          Dr Gibbons:  Well, I think that they are Mr Grice’s words which would never have been discussed with me.  But I think simply what he is saying if Ministers want more control of the process, getting a greater majority on the panel is one way to do it. 

 

216.          Mr Campbell QC:  Might one assume that that includes control of the result? 

 

217.          Dr Gibbons:  I would not have gone to that conclusion from that.  I think the Secretary of State particularly was aware that the process of, once the panel was formed, finding the winner would be independent of political influence. 

 

218.          Mr Campbell QC:  You see, he talks in the same paragraph at the end about:

 

219.“In at least ensuring that we could not be outvoted.”

 

220.          I have to assume that “we” means the Scottish Office establishment.  Is it completely wrong of me, of my nasty, suspicious mind, to suspect that the Scottish Office establishment was wanting to keep control of not only the process but ultimately of the result by having an in-built majority? 

 

221.          Dr Gibbons:  Well, that of course did not happen.  So whether the discussion that took place after I came back had any influence, I do not know.  But I would not have said that it was necessarily an expression that the Scottish Office wanted control of the decision at the end of the day; but that they really wanted control of the process. 

 

222.          Mr Campbell QC:  So you are quite happy to acknowledge with me that they wanted to keep control of the process? 

 

223.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes. 

 

224.          Mr Campbell QC:  OK.  The rest of the letter talks about potential panel members and I do not think anything turns on that. 

 

225.          Dr Gibbons:  Could I just add something?  We were really being urged by the RIBA to keep control of the process.  From their experience of running competitions, when we consulted with them, they thought that for a client like a Government Department was an important factor.  And I and the RIAS readily reacted and understood that. 

 

226.          Mr Campbell QC:  It is difficult for me to understand what the real difference is between control of a process and control of the outcome of that process.  After all, you as the Scottish Office could set down a timetable and appoint a bunch of people off the street and say, “Here is a timetable; go away and adhere to the timetable.”  That would be keeping control of the process; but you would lose control of the outcome, would you not? 

 

227.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.  I think that what was understood was that once the panel was appointed they were each individually free agents to act in selecting what they thought to be the most appropriate solution, the most appropriate design team, to solve these problems.  But the dangers of the competition process were still very evident; there were still problems of issues leaking.  That was, in a way, the control of the process. 

 

228.          Mr Campbell QC:  What sort of issues? 

 

229.          Dr Gibbons:  Well, if two panel members take different views about the final settlement, if you like, and then decide to reinforce their positions by letting their views be known to the press, either the architectural press or the lay press.  That has happened quite regularly.  So the process becomes a more public process, which is exactly what was not wanted.  What was wanted was a process that was as uncontroversial as possible.

 

230.          Mr Campbell QC:  Or as private as possible.  

 

231.          Dr Gibbons:  Privacy was an important aspect, I think, of that. 

 

232.          Mr Campbell QC:  When the design solutions of the five finalists were exhibited it was not for the purpose of getting the public’s view, was it?  It was really for the purpose of simply disseminating information to the public. 

 

233.          Dr Gibbons:  The prime purpose was not, as it were, to get... One never expected that there would be conclusive proof from that exercise.  But it seemed to be important to allow the information that we had to be put on display.  Once that was done it seemed important to allow the public to express views about it. 

 

234.          Mr Campbell QC:  Why?

 

235.          Dr Gibbons:  Because architects are very interested in public reaction to what was being proposed.  The Secretary of State thought that was very important; that the opportunity was allowed. 

 

236.          Mr Campbell QC:  It seems, if I may say so, to be a form of transparency.  In the sense, the public can look at the final entries, but really it is a form of transparency almost through smoked glass — nothing can come back through one-way glass. 

 

237.          Dr Gibbons:  Quite a lot came back.  I think the panel took quite a lot of reassurance from the position, for example, of the Enric Miralles proposals in that rather simple view that was taken of public popularity, if you like.  I mean, I think if the Miralles proposals had been fifth in the list of publicly preferred proposals that might have had a different impact than being equal first. 

 

238.          And there were many detailed aspects of the proposals which were presented by Mrs Doig. I think we had 40,000 respondents, and the information from that had to be collated very quickly and made available to the panel members over a weekend.  That was done very quickly.  Mrs Doig came to the panel on the Monday and explained the results of that.  What she explained was the Miralles scheme and the Rafael Vinoly scheme were the preferred schemes by the majority of people visiting the exhibition. 

 

239.          Mr Campbell QC:  So the panel had that information? 

 

240.          Dr Gibbons:  They had that information.  As I say, I think it was important that the Miralles scheme was seen as being popular by the public. 

 

241.          Mr Campbell QC:  That is helpful.  Can I just ask you now one or two questions of detail about the paperwork?  Could you turn to SE/3/031, please?  This is a draft of the OJEC notice.  I would like to ask you about the following page, SE/3/032, item 7, “Variants will not be accepted”.  What am I to understand by that term?

 

242.          Dr Gibbons:  I am not sure.  As I said yesterday, I did not prepare —

 

243.          Mr Campbell QC:  Sorry, did I ask you about this yesterday?

 

244.          Dr Gibbons:  You asked me this yesterday. 

 

245.          Mr Campbell QC:  I apologise. 

 

246.          Dr Gibbons:   The answer is the same:  I do not honestly know. 

 

247.          Mr Campbell QC:  Who should I ask?

 

248.          Dr Gibbons:  I think Bill Armstrong prepared the OJEC advert. 

 

249.          Mr Campbell QC:  On the same page at the bottom we see a requirement for individuals to provide at least £5 million for each of the claim of PII.  We know from Miralles’s PQQ, which you can see at page CB/1/145, that he had provided the panel with a certificado de seguro, if my Spanish pronunciation is OK.  At the foot of the page we learn that the limits are respectively 10 million and 100 million pesetas, which broadly translate to £40,000 or £400,000.  Was that something you picked up on the PQQ process? 

 

250.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.  It is a very common problem.  The actual requirement is the ability to provide cover of £5 million for each and every claim, not actually to have it in claim.  It is a regular problem with architectural practices because, as you can imagine, the cost of a premium with a £5 million cover is extraordinarily high.  And for smaller and medium-sized practices they would not have that in place because it also relates to their fee income; their premium relates to their fee income.  This has been a regular problem for the last 10 years. 

 

251.          Mr Campbell QC:  Nevertheless, you set the limit in your OJEC notice at this level; you must have done that on an informed basis. 

 

252.          Dr Gibbons:  It is a Treasury requirement. 

 

253.          Mr Campbell QC:  So why was it that when Miralles returned his certificate with these much lower numbers in it he was not rejected from the long list?

 

254.          Dr Gibbons:  Because he had the ability to get that cover. 

 

255.          Mr Campbell QC:  Where is the evidence of that?

 

256.          Dr Gibbons:  There is no evidence within these papers presumably, but the common experience is that the variable in all of this is the cost of that cover.  He would have got that cover, but it is what it cost.  What he was saying he would do, which he was asked at interview, was would he get that cover, and the answer was yes.

 

257.          Mr Campbell QC:  Yes, but he got to interview without having provided you with any information that he could get that cover. 

 

258.          Dr Gibbons:  Well, he said he could get that.  As I say —

 

259.          Mr Campbell QC:  I am sorry, Dr Gibbons, this will not do.  The PQQs were analysed by the members of the panel on an individual basis without interviewing the competitors.  One of the criteria set out in the OJEC notice is the provision of evidence of ability to provide PII of at least five million quid for each and every claim.  That was not before the panel; nevertheless, the panel shortlisted Enric Miralles.  Why?

 

260.          Dr Gibbons:  Well, because I think the professional members of the panel certainly all understood that he would be able to get that cover.  I do not think that PQQ is alone in that situation.  He was not registered in this country; as soon as he moved he would need to move to a proposal with a British underwriter, which ultimately would happen.  But I think the professional knowledge of the panel was that the only issue was how much it would cost him and he was prepared to take that on. 

 

261.          Mr Campbell QC:  You were a professional member of the panel.  Did you know that Miralles could provide evidence of ability to provide a higher cover?

 

262.          Dr Gibbons:  I knew that he would be able to get the cover. 

 

263.          Mr Campbell QC:  How did you know that?

 

264.          Dr Gibbons:  Well, because I think just through discussion... I mean the problem of indemnity insurance for architects was a very lively debate; it still is.  And this is a common problem; we had exactly this problem with other major projects.  Finding this cover is dealt with really rather later in the day, but it can be done. 

 

265.          Mr Campbell QC:  But why was it a requirement then for the first long-list process?

 

3.15 pm

 

266.          Dr Gibbons:  It is a Treasury requirement and I assume it was just put straight into the PQQ.

 

267.          Mr Campbell QC:  Can we agree this: that Miralles survived the long list and was shortlisted despite his failure at the first stage to provide evidence of adequate insurance cover in accordance with Treasury requirements?

 

268.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

269.          Mr Campbell QC:  Thank you.

 

270.          Dr Gibbons:  Sorry, I suppose I have to add, as far as I am aware.  Mr Armstrong may have other evidence.

 

271.          Mr Campbell QC:  I am sure he will tell us if he does.  Thank you for that.

 

272.          Could you look please at document SE/3/162?  This is Mr Armstrong writing to Mr Gordon and copying, among others, to yourself, and the date you will notice is 4 February 1998.  I would like to direct you to paragraph 5:

 

273.“Although there may be other reasons for involving Sebastian Tombs, I am against this.  We have seen how information in the hands of the RIAS is distorted when it becomes public.  I am not sure if he is accepted by the RIAS members as an expert practising architect.”

 

274.          What is Mr Armstrong telling you there?

 

275.          Dr Gibbons:  If one refers back to the letter or minute from Paul Grice about further RIAS involvement in the process, I think this is Bill Armstrong reacting to that and saying “I do not think that is a wise move”.

 

276.          Mr Campbell QC:  Did Mr Armstrong have some problem that you know about with the RIAS?

 

277.          Dr Gibbons:  The Scottish Office at the time was having some difficulty in dealing with the RIAS’s views on design competitions.

 

278.          Mr Campbell QC:  In relation to this project or in other cases?

 

279.          Dr Gibbons:  No, in relation to this project. Moving through a sequence of events from initially wishing to run and organise the competition, to opposition to the designer competition, and to a degree this was being conducted in the columns of newspapers rather than by direct correspondence.  I was aware of Bill’s strong feelings about this.  I was not here when that happened, but that really was saying no to Paul Grice’s suggestion to involve the RIAS in some way within the process.

 

280.          Mr Campbell QC:  Could you look in the same document at paragraph 7.2 please? 

 

281.“Shortlisting criteria – a document is being produced to guide the assessors on the first stage.”

 

282.          I presume by assessors he means the selection panel.

 

283.          Dr Gibbons:  I would think so.

 

284.          Mr Campbell QC:  Did he produce a document for that purpose?

 

285.          Dr Gibbons:  That is the document we looked at yesterday.

 

286.          Mr Campbell QC:  And ultimately was that used during the PQQ process?

 

287.          Dr Gibbons:  It was used by Mr Armstrong.  It was used, and after a discussion with me when I also used it, it was not used any further.

 

288.          Mr Campbell QC:  And was it used by other members of your panel?

 

289.          Dr Gibbons:  No. 

 

290.          Mr Campbell QC:  Do you know, in examining the first stage of this process, do you know what process was applied by the members of the panel, other than yourself, in shortlising from 70 to 17?

 

291.          Dr Gibbons:  Not in any detail, and it was variable.  Both Joan O’Connor and Andrew MacMillan were very experienced at assessing proposals in the form that they were coming forward.  Joan O’Connor with a background as a project manager actually had her own systems in place, if you like, with which she was very familiar.  Andy MacMillan had the system in mind which is the system that we ended up with.  It was a sort of, what he would describe as looking at the total picture and looking at the output from practices and making evaluations in a more general sense, but very familiar with the process that was used of sort of comparative rank ordering.

 

292.          Mr Campbell QC:  I am sure that their familiarity is not in question.  What I asked you was: do you know what process the —

 

293.          Dr Gibbons:  Well, those were the two processes that we used.  Joan had her own; Andy had his own; what I provided was the simplistic criteria list and an invitation to discuss how we used it to rank order the…

 

294.          Mr Campbell QC:  And was that an invitation that was taken up?

 

295.          Dr Gibbons:  No.  There was great reluctance to using it. 

 

296.          Mr Campbell QC:  Even by the lay members, Ms Wark and Mr Gordon.

 

297.          Dr Gibbons:  Well, by the major lay member.  The Secretary of State was very resistant to the idea of marking.

 

298.          Mr Campbell QC: Well, I understand that, but what about the PQQs?  Did the Secretary of State work his own way through the 70 PQQs?

 

299.          Dr Gibbons:  No.  Over a period of about an hour and a half I took him through the PQQs.  He asked slightly different questions and in some areas more general questions.  He asked, for example, to have abstracted from the 70, architects who had actually previously designed Parliaments, which I remember doing.

 

300.          Mr Campbell QC:  And that meeting with the Secretary of State is not minuted, I think.

 

301.          Dr Gibbons:  That meeting with the Secretary of State followed on from one of the press presentations that were made in the morning.  It is a meeting which is visually quite well recorded — with lots of photographs of the Secretary of State looking through the 70 PQQs.

 

302.          Mr Campbell QC:  Yes, but you understand Dr Gibbons, that my concern here is not to discuss in any way the merits of the applicants, but to look at the process that was followed.

 

303.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

304.          Mr Campbell QC:  So are we agreed, or is it a fair summary of your evidence that the Secretary of State did not work through the PQQs himself, but he did so with your assistance?

 

305.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

306.          Mr Campbell QC:  And that would be just the two of you?

 

307.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes. 

 

308.          Mr Campbell QC:  What about Mr Gordon?  Do you know what Mr Gordon did?

 

309.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes, he went through the 70 by himself, as far as I am aware.  He had fairly easy access — I mean physically — easy access within Victoria Quay to where this enormous pile of 70 submissions were.

 

310.          Mr Campbell QC:  And have you any idea what Miss Wark did as far as the PQQs were concerned?

 

311.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.  Like everybody else, she initially had copies, duplicates.  Many of the PQQs did not duplicate easily — particularly the visual material in the PQQs — after she had had those for a period of time she asked to come to Victoria Quay, and by that time, from memory, she had already produced a list of her own, of a smaller number. She asked for that number of PQQs to be put on one side for her, to be given a room for the best part of a morning when she went through the 20-odd that she had selected to look at the originals.

 

312.          Mr Campbell QC:  But she had had the 70 originals?

 

313.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

314.          Mr Campbell QC:  Copies of the 70?

 

315.          Dr Gibbons:  She had had copies of them, yes.

 

316.          Mr Campbell QC:  Please look at document SE/3/077C.  Is SE/3/077C a document produced by you?

 

317.          Dr Gibbons:  By me or my office, yes.

 

318.          Mr Campbell QC:  Yes.  Was it used?

 

319.          Dr Gibbons:  It was not used.  This is the document that was produced for the second stage interviews.  It was sent to the panel members with an invitation to use it and to discuss it with me at the morning of the interviews.  I mean, when I say that it was not used, obviously I used it, but it is a document by then which Alastair Wyllie and I were quite familiar in using.

 

320.          Mr Campbell QC:  Right.  And there was no direction to use it?

 

321.          Dr Gibbons:  No.  The invitation was to consider using it.

 

322.          Mr Campbell QC:  Did you carry out visits to the 12 or as many as you could of the 12 shortlisted candidates between the two sets of interviews?

 

323.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

324.          Mr Campbell QC:  And how many did you visit?

 

325.          Dr Gibbons:  I think we visited all 12.  Not me personally, but the team visited all 12.

 

326.          Mr Campbell QC:  Was there a report of those visits?

 

327.          Dr Gibbons:  No.

 

328.          Mr Campbell QC:  Or was there a discussion about your impression from those visits?

 

329.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

330.          Mr Campbell QC:  You have told us you visited Barcelona with Professor MacMillan, and other people made other visits.  One person, we learned this morning, made no visits at all in connection with this.  Can I take it that there is really no audit trail of these visits so as to reflect the views which have been brought back into the consensual process?

 

331.          Dr Gibbons:  No.

 

332.          Mr Campbell QC:  None at all?

 

333.          Dr Gibbons:  Well, not…

 

334.          Mr Campbell QC:  Was there ever?

 

335.          Dr Gibbons:  No.  There was material brought back from the visits, but that is the only physical evidence of what happened.  When we rank-ordered, at the various stages, whatever number were being rank-ordered, the people who had made the visits were invited to say something about their particular view of both the resources, the architecture that they had seen.  So then what flowed from that was a discussion.

 

336.          Mr Campbell QC:  So it was an oral account of any visits that had been made?

 

337.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

338.          Mr Campbell QC:  Not tabulated in any way?

 

339.          Dr Gibbons:  No.  And it was supplemented by the knowledge of some of the panel members who had not been on the visit but had, in many cases, more intimate knowledge of the products that were being produced by the practices. 

 

340.          Mr Campbell QC:  Could you please look at SE/3/114?  This is a memo from Mr Armstrong to you dated 11 June 1998: I see the date on the foot of the first page.  He is, to put it no higher, disenchanted with the final list.  He says at paragraph 2,

 

341.“If this had been an architectural competition they would all be disqualified for ignoring the brief”.

 

342.          He finds

 

343.“only Vinoly and Miralles as serious contenders”.

 

344.          He says at paragraph 4:

 

345.“I should think none of these proposals could be built within the budget”.

 

346.          He emphasises his doubts on

 

347.“the Miralles/RMJM marriage and also Meier/Keppie.”,

 

348.          and he says he does not

 

349.“envy the panel or the Secretary of State in making a decision”.

 

350.          Could you describe for me Mr Armstrong’s attitude to this process which was taking place?

 

351.          Dr Gibbons:  I think he was increasingly becoming unhappy that the process was leading us towards selecting architects that one would describe as riskier propositions: less-known quantities and architects with reputations for more controversial designs, more unusual, innovative designs, and I think he was expressing concern that that was the way the process was going. He was beginning to recognise that that was the way the process was going.

 

352.          Mr Campbell QC:  Did you agree with that?

 

353.          Dr Gibbons:  No.  No.  I think there were several misunderstandings here.  I think some of the comments here are only valid in relation to a classical design competition, not a designer competition.  I mean, ignoring the brief, I do not think the information that was being provided in such a conceptual form was necessarily going to be one hundred per cent accurate in translating the brief in terms of precise fit between the brief and the proposals that were being put forward.  I took some encouragement from the fact that, of the contenders, he warmed to Enric Miralles more than any of the others.

 

354.          Mr Campbell QC:  Can I look at page SE/3/116 please in this sequence, and going down, could I look at the second bullet point.

 

355.“I would question the marriage of EMBT/RMJM.  All our previous questions on RMJM’s abilities, which took them out at the first sift, are liable to be overlooked.”

 

356.          This was a confidential memo to you, Dr Gibbons.  What were the previous questions on RMJM’s abilities which took them out at the first sift?

 

357.          Dr Gibbons:  I do not recall them being expressed at the first sift.  The reasons that RMJM were not successful…

 

358.          Mr Campbell QC:  It is not so much the reasons that they were not successful as “All our previous questions”.  Can you recall what the previous questions were?

 

359.          Dr Gibbons:  No. The previous discussion and debate at the time of the first sift was about the design abilities of the practices rather than the technical, practical resource aspects of the practices.  My recollection is that there were no serious questions on RMJM’s abilities, other than those which came from Mr Armstrong.  I do not think that other panel members expressed…

 

360.          Mr Campbell QC: Mr Armstrong of course was not a panel member. He was a technical adviser.

 

361.          Dr Gibbons: No, no. But he had expressed to me reservations —

 

362.          Mr Campbell QC: Thank you. If you could close off that document now, please. 

 

363.          So you do not remember what he was referring to there.

 

364.          Dr Gibbons: No, no, I do not recognise there what he was referring to.

 

365.          Mr Campbell QC: So when you got to the final interview, and to a certain extent we have covered this already today — were you listening to the broadcast this morning?

 

3.30 pm

 

366.          Dr Gibbons: No, I’m sorry, there was a technical breakdown. [Laughs].

 

367.          Mr Campbell QC: You would have been, though. 

 

368.          Dr Gibbons: Yes, I would have been.

 

369.          Mr Campbell QC:  When you got to the final interview, you had six boards from Miralles and the other competitors. Did you have other information from Miralles?

 

370.          Dr Gibbons: There were models, that I recall; there were some toys, in a way, he had produced some flick books that were drawings that allowed you to see how the scheme was developing; there were, I think from memory… No, at an earlier stage he had produced a big book recording his work. That was all we had. And a presentation.

 

371.          Mr Campbell QC: And the presentation from Miralles and the RMJM people themselves?

 

372.          Dr Gibbons: Yes. Well, a presentation from Enric Miralles first of all on how they would work; how he would lead the design from Barcelona, how the latter stages of execution, with some design input from RMJM, would take place. Basically that was it.

 

373.          Mr Campbell QC: And how long did it take the panel to make a decision?

 

374.          Dr Gibbons: From memory, probably an hour, hour and a quarter.

 

375.          Mr Campbell QC: Did the panel apply systematic criteria to that process?

 

376.          Dr Gibbons: Only in the comparative rank assessment method, so no, they had all the information, but they —

 

377.          Mr Campbell QC: Tell me about that.

 

378.          Dr Gibbons: Well, every submission, every presentation was discussed first of all on its own. So one started off with number one, discussed it, and then moved to number two, discussed that, and then we made a cumulative joint decision as to which of those two… We rank ordered those two, then we rank ordered three, then we rank ordered four, then we rank ordered five. But in the middle of all of that, I think Miralles came out… Everybody, really, declared how very impressed they were with that presentation and that proposal.

 

379.          Mr Campbell QC: I am sorry to dwell on this. If I may just for a moment, can I just understand this: did you then, rather like a jury say, “Who do we think are the first two”, and then did you cast one away?

 

380.          Dr Gibbons: No, we were able to say very clearly who do we think is the first one, and the first one was a unanimous, relatively easy selection, which I think was focused very quickly by the Secretary of State: “we are all agreed this is an outstanding architect, an outstanding submission — this is the architect that we want”.

 

381.          Mr Campbell QC: So you really began by choosing a winner?

 

382.          Dr Gibbons: No. I’m saying that we moved to that situation very quickly having done the process of rank ordering.

 

383.          Mr Campbell QC: Oh, sorry, having done the process of ranking. And when doing the process of ranking, did you apply a list of criteria, or was it just an educated hunch?

 

384.          Dr Gibbons: Well it was quite a well-educated hunch in some senses, I think, but it was looking at the whole proposition, yes. It was everybody having the opportunity to say what they felt about each of the submissions, with the Secretary of State joining them all together.

 

385.          Mr Campbell QC: Miss O’Connor this morning told us, as you would have seen if you had been watching, that scoring took place in the process of the final interview. I think we need to look at JO/1/091A please.

 

386.          This is a construct of her own which has the names removed from the top for obvious reasons. Did you all follow a methodology of this kind?

 

387.          Dr Gibbons: I followed —

 

388.          Mr Campbell QC: Sorry, I should have said this is the first stage interview, not the second stage interview.

 

389.          Dr Gibbons: Joan followed this methodology right from the start, and the debate that we had about whether or not she would follow the methodology that I was putting forward was very much that she was more comfortable with her own. She accepted that it was helpful for her, in the way that she assessed submissions, to have some sort of assessment panel. She was a very experienced project manager who was used to appointing consultants; very familiar with this system and didn’t want to learn another system. So we knew she was using this system.

 

390.          Mr Campbell QC: So even when we get to the final stage of selecting one from five, there isn’t a common method in use amongst the six judges.

 

391.          Dr Gibbons: No, except for that rank ordering process which I described.

 

392.          Mr Campbell QC: And that consisted of putting the five competitors in a rank of one to five?

 

393.          Dr Gibbons: Yes.

 

394.          Mr Campbell QC: Not by marking them against criteria?

 

395.          Dr Gibbons: No, it was by comparing one with one. But at the end of the day, the proposition was that one of them would be employed as our architect, so the question was “which one as an individual panel member would you recommend?”.

 

396.          Mr Campbell QC: Just explain to me a little more. Did you then pair them up two at a time and then discard one and then pair the remaining one with —

 

397.          Dr Gibbons: No. We cumulatively added, added, added.  So we looked at the first submission.  I think from memory what actually happened was after the first presentation there was a brief discussion of that presentation.  So there was an immediate discussion of that presentation, and at the end of all of them there was the rounding up where from memory we went through each in turn by sort of saying “well, x: what do you think of x?”. At the start you can only think in abstract terms, but when you’ve got x and then you’ve got y, or a and b or 1 and 2, you have something to measure against the other.

 

398.          Mr Campbell QC: Right. As part of the measuring process you had a contribution to the discussion from DLE (Davis Langdon and Everest), who had done some indicative costings which were heavily qualified. You have seen those, I’m sure.

 

399.          Dr Gibbons: Yes. Yes, I have.

 

400.          Mr Campbell QC: I do not need to turn them up again.

 

401.          Dr Gibbons: No.

 

402.          Mr Campbell QC: I’d like to know, though, to what extent those costings and take-offs of indicative floor areas informed the discussion. For example, it is clear in looking at them that some of the proposals are larger than the indications given in the ‘building user brief’.

 

403.          Dr Gibbons: Yes; I think everybody accepted that the quantity surveyors’ assessment was fairly broad-brush at that stage.

 

404.          Mr Campbell QC: My question was to what extent was this work by DLE influential on the panel in either deciding to accept or reject.

 

405.          Dr Gibbons: It was useful and helpful. It demonstrated the ballpark that one was in; it indicated what… if that architect was commissioned on those sort of conceptual ideas the cost would have to be brought down or the size of the project would have to be brought down. They were not helpful in one sense, which was that we were of course not dealing with buildings at that stage, whereas some of the competitors actually had submitted buildings: the two Americans particularly, who I think believed that there would be benefit in going beyond the conceptual stage to a stage where you could actually put forward proposals. That was a much easier exercise for the quantity surveyors to cost. But no, the cost information was very helpful.

 

406.          Mr Campbell QC: You see, we have got two schemes — I will not turn them up for you because it is invidious to look at them now — but we have got two schemes which appear to exceed in size the brief figure of 2740 sq m by about 50%, and in one case more. I would be keen to know whether those two schemes were rejected on that ground alone or whether they were rejected on any other grounds.

 

407.          Dr Gibbons: They were not rejected on those grounds, no. They were rejected on grounds of the conceptual approach. Three of the schemes were monolithic in character; they were large schemes, and part of the concept was that the architect saw these as large imposing schemes, in a sense, more in the direction of the symbol of the State. The Miralles scheme, and the scheme from the Glass Murray partnership was composed of smaller parts; it was a smaller scale, a more human scheme, and these were the type of considerations that were made. There was no doubt that the bigger schemes could be brought down in area, which would have resulted in a change to the cost.

 

408.          Mr Campbell QC: So it would be wrong to suppose that these schemes were rejected simply because they appear to exceed the brief?

 

409.          Dr Gibbons: Yes, very much so. The cost information was not the only information that was made available at the final stages. There were papers from the Royal Fine Art Commission, from the Institute of Landscape Architects and from others. All the information that we had been able to gather at that time was presented to the panel.

 

410.          Mr Campbell QC: We will just see if we can tick that off, because this is my final point.

 

411.          Aside from the contributions of the competitors, we have some synthesis, carried out in a hurry, of the public response, by Mrs Doig.

 

412.          Dr Gibbons: That is right.

 

413.          Mr Campbell QC: We have a contribution from John Hume of Historic Scotland, and I am aware of a contribution being made by Mr Armstrong, but I am not clear whether that was put in front of the panel.

 

414.          Dr Gibbons: It was tabled.

 

415.          Mr Campbell QC: It was tabled… Any other?

 

416.          Dr Gibbons: Yes. There is a contribution from the Edinburgh Old Town Association, which was tabled; the World Heritage Organisation, which was tabled; the Royal Fine Art Commission, which was tabled; all in response to a letter which I wrote to them in the fortnight before, asking them for comments on the final five.

 

417.          Mr Campbell QC: And the Cockburn Association as well?

 

418.          Dr Gibbons: Yes, and what is called the Confederation of Landscape Industries in Scotland. Everybody, in a sense, who had registered an interest through the exhibitions of wanting… they had something to say, so they were formally invited to say something, and then the results of that were put, were tabled at the meeting.

 

419.          Mr Campbell QC: And were they given to the members of the selection panel?

 

420.          Dr Gibbons: Yes.

 

421.          Mr Campbell QC: I would like to ask you finally, please, about the question of financial offers and fee bids. Please explain to me how that works, or how it was designed to work. 

 

422.          Dr Gibbons: My understanding at the start of the process, was following preparation of the competition structure, discussions with the RIBA’s competition unit. It was at that stage that this system was advised that we should use. We asked the teams separately. Mr Armstrong wrote to each of the teams with a pro forma setting out the form that we wanted their fee offer to be made in, in timescale terms slightly behind the submission of their drawings.

 

423.          That followed through to the end, so we did not have their separate envelope fee bids describing a percentage for all three consultants until I think two days after the deliberations of the design panel. When we had them, midday two days later, they were opened and we had set on the file — which is here — from a combination of Mr Armstrong’s records and departmental records a range of the fee that we would expect for the whole team; a bottom and top figure.

 

424.          Mr Campbell QC: Expressed as what? A percentage?

 

425.          Dr Gibbons: A total percentage.

 

426.          Mr Campbell QC: Of building costs?

 

427.          Dr Gibbons: Of building costs. We also estimated what we expected the fee to be. The understanding that we had — and this was explained to all panel members, and I explained at the time that it was my belief that this was in accordance with EC rules — was that this was how it had to be.

 

428.          It was at the stage when I explained this to the Secretary of State that the first difficulties really emerged — that there was another tier in the process. There had been a unanimous selection of Enric Miralles, but suddenly the Secretary of State realised that there was another hurdle to go through, which was to ensure that the fee bid was within this predetermined limit.

 

429.          My understanding was that under EC rules we could not negotiate over the fee bid, so we had to accept that when the second envelope was opened, if that was outwith this predetermined range, we would have to move to the second premiated designer on the list.

 

430.          My problem, which started at the interview, was… I raised it in the context of saying “we therefore have to rank order all five of the submissions; we cannot just say this is an outstanding winner, we have to find a second”. That was not altogether easily accepted by the Secretary of State… Well, he did not accept it. He said, “ if you find that is the case, before you take any other action, come back to me with the fee bid once you have it”.

 

 

431.          Mr Campbell QC:  So can I try to summarise that then?  Assuming a winner — competitor A — you would then open competitor A’s fees and, provided it fell within a range, competitor A could then go forward to being declared as the winner?

 

432.          Dr Gibbons:  Correct.

 

433.          Mr Campbell QC:  In the Department of the Environment rules, there is something called the “two-envelope system”.

 

434.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

435.          Mr Campbell QC:  Is that what we are discussing?

 

436.          Dr Gibbons:  It is a variety of that.  It is a variation on that, which we were told by the RIBA was within the EC rules.

 

437.          Mr Campbell QC:  Did you check that out with your own lawyers in the Scottish Office?

 

438.          Dr Gibbons:  I cannot recall.  Mr Armstrong is perhaps the best person to ask that.  It was, I thought, checked out with the EC that this was OK, and that was my understanding that it was.

 

3.45 pm

 

439.          Mr Campbell QC:  If you look at document RI/1/023… This is an extract from the DoE rule book, as it were.  At the foot of the page, we see a heading: “Caution”.  Do you see that?

 

440.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

441.  Mr Campbell QC: “In projects which are substantially funded by Lottery or other public sources, the competitive interview procedure may be subject to EC rules.  This may have the effect of limiting the proprietor’s right to select on the basis of design quality, rather than fee levels.”

 

442.          Never mind the books method.

 

443.“Where the two-envelopes system is used, all fee proposals must be considered before a selection is finalised.”

 

444.          As a matter of fact, Dr Gibbons, you did not open all fee proposals, did you, in this case?

 

445.          Dr Gibbons:  No, we did not.

 

446.          Mr Campbell QC:  You applied the system that you have described to me, which was to find it within a range.

 

447.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes, and this was discussed with the RIBA, and the important words in terms of the interpretation by the RIBA were the words

 

448.“may be subject to EC rules”.

 

449.          So we were aware, and that is why we wanted to make absolutely sure with the EC that there were no obvious objections to this.

 

450.          Mr Campbell QC:  I do have to suggest to you that it is a little odd for a public authority in Scotland to be going to the RIBA for legal advice on EC procurement rules.

 

451.          Dr Gibbons:  Well, we were going to the RIBA for advice on the broad aspects of the competition, not for legal advice on the interpretation.  And the advice we were getting is a) obviously architectural competitions do not fall very easily within EC rules; the other point that the RIBA were making was that different interpretations of EC rules in different countries led to different forms of competition.  And there was interesting back-up to that from the International Union of Architects, who were saying exactly the same thing to us — trying to understand why we were interpreting rules in one way here, which were not being interpreted in the same way in countries like France, which had a very large programme of competitions.

 

452.          Mr Campbell QC:  Does it seem with hindsight that it might have been better to have these rules more clearly articulated before the process began?

 

453.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes, I think that, probably, the judgement at the time is that there was not time to articulate this.

 

454.          Mr Campbell QC:  But in learning from this process, might we look to see these rules better articulated on another occasion.

 

455.          Dr Gibbons:  Absolutely, and I think that we are looking at a document which is now — is it 10 years old?  It is a fairly ancient document, and certainly the methodology and the philosophy of architectural competitions has moved on fairly dramatically.

 

456.          Mr Campbell QC:  You told me you had in your possession a document setting the fee level limits for this exercise.  I do not think that has been produced to the Inquiry.  Are you prepared to produce it to the Inquiry?

 

457.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

458.          Mr Campbell QC:  Thank you.  Well, perhaps you would do that in due course.

 

459.          I am much obliged, Sir, thank you.

 

460.          Lord Fraser:  Dr Gibbons, just on that last point: one of the criteria you set out in your OJEC advertisement was “economically most advantageous”.  Is that right?

 

461.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

462.          Lord Fraser:  If that was one of the criteria, should the design panel not have had the opportunity to open up all the fees, and add that into the evaluation of the different bids?

 

463.          Dr Gibbons:  Where that has been done subsequently in other places, you need to factor in some — give some — relativity to the importance that you attach to each of those components.  That was not done.  I think this is another lesson from hindsight, if you like, because, in actual fact, you could rate that dimension very low on the scale of things.  What clearly was being rated very high on our scale was the design aspects of it.

 

464.          Lord Fraser:  Yes, I think Mr Campbell has put it to you more than once that, as we look at these criteria which you put up when you put it out for tender, they all appear to be of equal weight.

 

465.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

466.          Lord Fraser:  But in fact, from what we have heard from you, and from Professor MacMillan, and Miss O’Connor, that clearly, at least to the three of you — I do not know about the other three — the quality of the design or the designer’s capabilities was what really weighed heavily in your minds.  And it would appear from the unanimity you say existed on the design panel, that that weighed heavily in the minds of the others as well.

 

467.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

468.          Lord Fraser:  I am wary about asking this next question, Dr Gibbons, because it might be taken up by some as an indication that I have already made up my mind.  I hasten to assure you that I have not made up my mind on anything yet.  However, you will have been aware — and I think you signalled that to Mr Campbell — that there has been, more than once, some suggestion that the relationship between yourself and RMJM was too close.  You went off to Barcelona to see Mr Miralles.  Is there any significance that you, as the Chief Architect at the Scottish Office at the time, should be going to see this particular contender for the job?

 

469.          Dr Gibbons:  I think that at the stage of the 12, he was one of perhaps three of the 12 that the panel thought was more risky.  There was less known about some aspects — the resource aspects.  He was well known as a teacher; he was well known as having an innovative architectural mind; he was well known as a writer.  Certainly, from a Scottish Office perspective, I knew less about his office, about his resources, and I knew less about his architecture in hard forms.

 

470.          So one of the things that I certainly came back with from Barcelona was the realisation that this was an architect who worked with the fluid form; concrete; with unusual shapes; with rich materials, but in a very simple form.  And that was the message that I certainly brought back — really to press others to see his architecture because this may not be the architecture that we normally come to expect.  But I thought in a way, other things were important — purely programming, timetabling issues.  It was an opportunity.  I thought he was one of the competitors that I would like to have seen to satisfy myself personally that he had it, as it were.

 

471.          Lord Fraser:  You indicated at an earlier stage that you did not like the idea — or the Scottish Office did not like the idea — of dealing with a concept architect in one firm, and an executive architect in another.  Your solution to that was that the two should come together in a single legal entity.  Is that right?

 

472.          Dr Gibbons:  That is right, yes.

 

473.          Lord Fraser:  That is exactly what happens after your visit to Barcelona.

 

474.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes.

 

475.          Lord Fraser:  Mr Miralles contacts… well, I do not know who contacted whom, but they made contact.  Are you sure you did not give slightly more direction to Mr Miralles and Robert Matthews Johnston-Marshall?  What was the form?

 

476.          Dr Gibbons:  Yes, quite sure.  The direction was given in the reaction at the first stage, really, which was of how important it was to be able to deliver the building.  As I said, two of the practices joined forces at that stage, and, of course, by that stage, all of the competitors had seen what all the competitors were doing.  So Enric Miralles, I think, realised that he was amongst the smaller number of firms who were there on their own.  And discussing with him, perhaps it had not even occurred to him.  But here he was doing his next major building — the biggest building he had done apart from the Parliament under construction — and he was working with a local architect in Utrecht.

 

477.          So I also was aware of what might lead from suggesting that he join forces with anybody, and therefore I was very clear, and I actually had a discussion with others — I am not sure whether it was with the Steering Group members or with other panel members — but I had certainly had a discussion about how we would deal with that request, if it came.

 

478.          Lord Fraser:  From the raw facts that we can establish, there is an inference that might be drawn that, first of all, RMJM are excluded from this competition — I do not enquire why — but you then go to Barcelona to see who turns out to be the eventual winner, and he joins up with RMJM in precisely the form that you or the Scottish Office would like to have seen him join up with a local firm.

 

479.          Dr Gibbons:  We would not have accepted, in theory, any of the architects joining up with any other partnership, except through a joint venture company.  That was what we were clear about.  But we were also concerned… and some of the firms that he mentioned to me in Barcelona we would not wish to have seen him join forces with.  Whether it was his lack of knowledge of the practice or what, but they would not have brought a complementary service to what he was offering.

 

480.          Lord Fraser:  There must some sort of concern, that just by rolling your eyes, if some small incompetent firm in Scotland was mentioned to you, you could not or would not have signalled to him that you would not think much of that as a proposal.

 

481.          Dr Gibbons:  Well I think I was expecting that he would come with some more specific questions, and I am pretty sure that my reaction was as bland as it could have been, which is: “No, we do not want to take part in the decision.  In principle, that is a route you could go down, but in practice, we are not going to advise you who to go to”.

 

482.          Lord Fraser:  Thank you very much, Dr Gibbons.  I think you appreciate that we are trying to deal with this Inquiry in stages, and I fear that we may have to call you back at some other time.

 

483.          Mr Campbell QC:  Thank you, Dr Gibbons.  I am much obliged to you.

 

484.          Sir, with the end of Dr Gibbons’s evidence, can I ask you to adjourn until 10.30 am tomorrow morning.  The witness tomorrow is Ms Kirsty Wark, followed in the afternoon by Mr Charles Prosser, the Secretary of Royal Fine Art Commission.

 

485.          Lord Fraser:  And possibly a third witness.

 

486.          Mr Campbell QC:  And possibly a third witness, I am not sure yet.

 

Hearing adjourned at 3.58 pm