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HOLYROOD INQUIRY TRANSCRIPT

 Thursday 6 November 2003 (Afternoon Session)

Hearing resumed at 2.15 pm.

 

1.      Mr Campbell QC: We were looking before lunch at your advice of 8 October 1997. Now, just going back a little bit, when we looked at comparative costings earlier one of the options which we considered was St Andrew’s House with an integral debating chamber, which is one of the ones that you worked up to a certain extent. Can I ask you to think with me about the possibility of any crossover between the estimate for that development and the estimated cost of necessary repairs to St Andrew’s House which were in your minds at that time and, if not planned, at least were forecast as being necessary for reasons of safety?

 

2.      Mr Brown: Right, could I ask you just to open up that question a little so that I am clear what information you are seeking?

 

3.      Mr Campbell QC: Yes, what I am anxious to find out is if any part of the necessary refurbishment of St Andrew’s House is included in the estimates which you put before Ministers.

 

4.      Mr Brown: Right, in the Annex that is attached to the submission of 8 October —

 

5.      Mr Campbell QC: Correct.

 

6.      Mr Brown: I think I can answer that quite clearly. We have obviously been interested here in the capital costs and the range of construction costs given for St Andrew’s House with an integral debating chamber was something like £65·7 million to £78·8 million. I am quite clear that these costs would include the £15 million to £20 million estimated as being necessary to sort out St Andrew’s House. And sorting out meant making the stonework secure and replacing building systems such as heating distribution and putting in raised floors for IT and all that stuff.

 

7.      Mr Campbell QC: Work which was subsequently done, in fact, once the selection of Holyrood was made?

 

8.      Mr Brown: It was. That is right.

 

9.      Mr Campbell QC: So that assessment then of that option included work which would have had to be done anyway?

 

10.  Mr Brown: Well, that is not quite accurate. It was work which would have to be done, or at least some of it would have to be done, if civil servants were to continue to occupy the building, partly for safety reasons and partly to give the building a life into the future so that we did not have to keep coming back to repair it. There was a range of options open to us on St Andrew’s House, and obviously it was not possible to make decisions about that until Ministers had decided where the Parliament was going to go.

 

11.  The range of options started at disposing of the building at whatever market value it had right through to properly repairing and refurbishing it and re-equiping it with heating systems and new windows and raised floors and all these things. The £15 million to £20 million range was for a fairly full scale, fairly thorough refurbishment of the building. The previous Administration actually had approved plans costed at only £6 million, basically to make the building safe. So that was the range of possibilities that was in prospect, but it is worth saying that submissions to Ministers towards later on in December include the option of the Scottish Office no longer using St Andrew’s House were it not to be used by the Parliament.

 

12.  Mr Campbell QC: In the end, of course, it was not; it was decided not to dispose of St Andrew’s House, to carry out a fairly extensive refurbishment?

 

13.  Mr Brown: Absolutely right, and the Secretary of State himself was very interested in that issue and was strongly in favour of retaining St Andrew’s House and using it as the headquarters of the Executive.

 

14.  Mr Campbell QC: Yes. I think that it is right that on 17 October the Secretary of State received presentations from Forth Ports and EDI in respect of Leith and Calton Hill respectively and that MacDonald Orr Kantel came forward with a similar type of presentation about a fortnight later.

 

15.  Mr Brown: Yes. Yes.

 

16.  Mr Campbell QC: Did the Secretary of State subsequently instruct comparative studies by independent architects of the three proposals?

 

17.  Mr Brown: Yes, he did, and that was announced publicly on 17 October, the same day as Forth Ports and EDI made their presentations. The two studies were announced that day, and I think that just at the beginning of November the Haymarket site was included as well.

 

18.  Mr Campbell QC: Yes. Can you help me with the rationale of going to an independent architectural feasibility study for three candidate sites when you already had in front of you for those three candidate sites somewhat worked-up proposals by their individual developers? Why not just test what you had against the knowledge that you had of your building user brief and reach a view then, reach a view in that way?

 

19.  Mr Brown: Yes. Well, this was a conclusion that the Secretary of State reached, and I do not now have any note of the discussion on 17 October, so we are trying, as it were, to infer or deduce what was in the Secretary of State’s mind at that time. I do not have any documentary evidence about that nor do I have personally any clear recollection of the discussion. But I think he was struck by the effort that had gone into the presentations by EDI and Forth Ports and by the architectural ideas that were developed in these presentations, and I think we could infer from that that he thought it would help him to finally make up his mind among the competing sites if he saw something that was more worked up in architectural terms for them.

 

20.  Mr Campbell QC: You have used the expression “more worked up”.

 

21.  Mr Brown: Yes.

 

22.  Mr Campbell QC: And yet we can now see with the benefit of hindsight that what was ultimately produced by way of feasibility studies by RMJM in respect of Haymarket and by Page and Park in respect of Calton Hill and by Benson and Forsyth in respect of Leith were not worked up at all. They were — what shall we say — indicative architectural ideas of those architects’ ideas for parliamentary provision on those three sites.

 

23.  Mr Brown: Yes. They were architecturally based examples of what could be done on these sites.

 

24.  Mr Campbell QC: But you had those already, Mr Brown, did you not, from the site promoters?

 

25.  Mr Brown: From the site promoters in terms of Forth Ports and EDI. Yes, we certainly had the outlines of schemes, as far as I recall, from the site promoters. I think it would be fair to say, one could not classify them as feasibility studies. They were outline ideas or schemes, which, of course, were undertaken by the promoters themselves.

 

26.  Mr Campbell QC: But so what? I mean it would be very much egg in your face, would it not, if you advanced the scheme and then it was later discovered by independent inspection to be a non-feasible scheme? These are mature, sensible people. They would not come forward with something that they did not think was going to work.

 

27.  Mr Brown: Yes, that is absolutely fair. I think one of the factors that would have been in the Secretary of State’s mind in asking that this further design feasibility work should be done would be that he did not want to be seen to be making his mind up purely on the basis of what site promoters themselves had indicated could be done. He genuinely wanted some independent input in terms of architectural ideas.

 

28.  Mr Campbell QC: But he did, of course, have your great expertise and that of your colleagues in the Construction and Building Control Group —

 

29.  Mr Brown: Yes.

 

30.  Mr Campbell QC: — the Procurement Branch, Finance Branch and all the other colleagues that you had working on this.

 

31.  Mr Brown: He did have that. In terms of architectural knowledge and skill, which is what we are talking about here, he had John Gibbons, the Chief Architect, and John had obviously been involved in interpreting the sites to the Secretary of State and explaining what could be done. It might be that the Inquiry might want to pursue with Dr Gibbons whether he himself provided any advice to the Secretary of State about this. I am sure that Dr Gibbons would have been consulted before the Secretary of State finally decided to ask for these feasibility studies to be commissioned.

 

32.  Mr Campbell QC: So you do not quite feel able to help me fully, do you, on the true rationale of having independent feasibility studies beyond what you have said already?

 

33.  Mr Brown: I do not think I can. As to the reasons why these were instructed, I am familiar with the events that led up to that, familiar also with the fact that the different site promoters were very keen to make the most of the attractions of their sites, which was entirely understandable, and familiar with the Secretary of State’s desire to get as much information — comparative information — and as many good ideas as he could about the respective sites. But John Gibbons, I think, could probably provide better information than I can on the actual decision point.

 

34.  Mr Campbell QC: Would you agree that there would appear to have been skills within the Scottish Office which were capable of detecting inflated claims by developers for their own sites in a rational and understandable way?

 

35.  Mr Brown: Well, yes, we certainly had skills either within the Scottish Office or, by that time, I think, available to us, for example in the shape of Jones Lang Wootton and in the shape of the independent quantity surveyors that were helping the Construction and Building Control Group. I would be less sure about the architectural skills available to the Office because clearly that was very much John Gibbons’s bailliwick.

 

36.  Mr Campbell QC: Do you know if the feasibility studies were commissioned from the three firms of architects who were identified following a competition, a procurement exercise?

 

37.  Mr Brown: No, my knowledge and understanding is that the matter was discussed within the Office. It was believed that the timescale to which we were working to satisfy the Secretary of State’s wishes rather eliminated the possibility of a competitive procurement, and after discussion it was proposed that we make appointments without competition. I was involved in clearing that proposal with the Accounting Officer, who at that time was Robert Gordon.

 

38.  Mr Campbell QC: So within the team, in other words, within the Constitution Group team you cleared that?

 

39.  Mr Brown: Yes, although as a matter of fact at that particular point Robert Gordon was formally the Accounting Officer for the central services vote within the Scottish Office, Sir Russell having withdrawn because of a potential conflict of interest.

 

40.  Mr Campbell QC: Yes, that is right.

 

41.  Mr Brown: And there is a minute on the file from myself to Robert Gordon that says, look, this is what we would propose to do; it is single tender which is not normal; here are the costs; here are the reasons for going single tender; are you prepared to agree this?

 

42.  And that minute had been prepared with input from colleagues in Finance Group, and in the exceptional circumstances of that time, it was approved, and the commissions were let.

 

43.  Mr Campbell QC: What were the exceptional circumstances?

 

44.  Mr Brown: The key exceptional circumstance was the timescale and the fact that the Secretary of State was very keen to make progress as quickly as possible.

 

45.  Mr Campbell QC:  Was it just that or was it that the Secretary of State was working to a deadline, the deadline being the Second Reading of the Scotland Bill?

 

46.  Mr Brown:  I have no accurate and detailed personal knowledge of a deadline to which the Secretary of State was working. I am aware, obviously, from press coverage of the Inquiry that that was the view, the clear recollection of Robert Gordon, and I have got absolutely no reason to demur from that, certainly no alternative suggestion to offer.

 

47.  Mr Campbell QC:  Did you take part then in the instructing of the feasibility studies, and arranging for the architects’ firms to be paid?

 

48.  Mr Brown:  The commissioning of the architects was undertaken by John Gibbons.  I made arrangements for budget cover to be provided.  Well, first of all, for financial approval to be given by Robert Gordon, as Accounting Officer, and then for budgetary cover to be provided.  So in that sense, making sure that the bills were paid, yes.

 

49.  Mr Campbell QC:  Was a brief given to each of the three firms, which was broadly the same in each case?

 

50.  Mr Brown:  Yes.  It would have been the same brief, augmented by whatever information we had about the sites.  And the brief would, of course, have been the latest version of the building user brief that we spoke about earlier. 

 

51.  Mr Campbell QC:  Do you know if the three firms were “assisted”, in inverted commas, with the work of the developers for each site?  Did they see the work of the developers for each site, or did they start with a clean sheet?

 

52.  Mr Brown:  I cannot tell you the answer to that.  I have got no recollection, and in preparing for the Inquiry, I cannot remember reading any papers that would shed light on that.  They would certainly have received information about the sites — in the case of the Leith site, Forth Ports would have been the source of that.

 

53.  Mr Campbell QC:  Can you look at SE/2/919, please?

 

54.  Is that an Information Directorate press notice rather—

 

55.  Mr Brown:  Yes, it is.

 

56.  Mr Campbell QC:  — where we see the Minister for Devolution naming consultants for the site selection work; reference to these feasibility studies; and on the next page, SE/2/920, the three firms are identified?

 

57.  Mr Brown:  Yes.  Yes.

 

2.30 pm

 

58.  Mr Campbell QC:  And can we note, please, that on the last paragraph on that page that specifically, DLE were asked to prepare comparative costings on the basis of the design feasibility studies?

 

59.  Can I say to you that it seems to me to be odd that when you had already done so much work on the likely cost of what you were intending that you commissioned DLE to look at new work, done by new architects on the sites, all in a hurry and to a very tight timetable?

 

60.  Mr Brown:  The observation I would make about that is that the objective in commissioning the architects was partly to enable the Secretary of State to see a worked-up interpretation of what could be achieved, in terms of a Parliament building at each of the three sites.  That is quite clear.  Aside from the issue of building costs, it was a question of how can we get the impact that we need at Leith; how can we get the impact that we need in Haymarket; and how can we blend this Category A listed building at St Andrew’s House?  These were all architectural problems to be considered and solved by skilled architects.

 

61.  Mr Campbell QC:  By impact, you mean civic presence, do you?

 

62.  Mr Brown:  Civic presence, yes.

 

63.  Mr Campbell QC:  If I could just continue on that line of questioning: necessarily, any work produced by DLE into such feasibility studies — and this is not to criticise the studies at all — but necessarily, that could only be broadly indicative of costs, could it not?

 

64.  Mr Brown:  That is absolutely right; and is central to what the Inquiry is looking into.

 

65.  Lord Fraser:  What I find odd is, and I think this is what is troubling Mr Campbell as well, any one of these three firms of architects was individually more than capable of carrying the feasibility on all three sites?

 

66.  Mr Brown:  You are asking for my observation on that, Lord Fraser?

 

67.  Lord Fraser:  Yes.

 

68.  Mr Brown:  This is John Gibbons’s area of expertise, rather than mine; but my recollection is that the individual firms were selected for reasons relating to where their particular expertise lay. At Page and Park, for example, they were familiar with listed buildings — Category A listed building in the case of St Andrew’s House.  Page and Park certainly had experience in that kind of department. 

 

69.  John Gibbons would be able to explain his reasoning behind recommending Benson and Forsyth, who were London-based I think, for Leith, and RMJM for Haymarket.  But in my recollection, there was a matching of the skills and experience of the architectural practices with the characteristics of the sites.

 

70.  Lord Fraser:  As Mr Campbell has been taking you through it… there was a great deal of expertise vested in the Scottish Office at the time to have conducted such an operation, and you have explained why you understood it was being done.  But if that was being done, I still have difficulty understanding that if you have got one quantity surveyor and cost consultants to look at all three sites, why do you not have one architect to look at all the sites?  Because then, I would have thought, you, in making submissions to the Secretary of State, or whoever was going to do it, could have been much more confident that there was a true comparison of like with like; and if you have got three perfectly skilled architects — and architects are always rather distinctively different in their approach to things — would that not that have given you a greater reassurance of confidence that you were comparing like with like?

 

71.  Mr Brown:  Possibly so.  As I have indicated, I think this is very much John Gibbons’s area of expertise.  It also seems to me that there was merit — and I think this was the kind of consideration that informed the decision at the time — that there was merit in choosing architects whose skills and experience were best suited, for example, to a waterfront location at Leith, or to modifying a very distinctive listed building at St Andrew’s House; and I am fairly confident that it was on that basis that the decision was taken to brief, or to commission three separate firms.  Obviously, they were all working to the same building brief.  So they were being asked to solve, in that sense, the same architectural problem, and to come up with a building of comparable size.

 

72.  There is also the thought — I offer this as an observation, I do not have any evidence to support it — that running three in parallel might telescope, or help to keep the timescale short.

 

73.  Lord Fraser:  I understand that.  Sorry, Mr Campbell.

 

74.  Mr Campbell QC:  Thank you.

 

75.  Can I understand that it was no part of those architects’ job to look into the financial implications of what they were doing?  That it was Davis Langdon and Everest who did that?

 

76.  Mr Brown:  DLE did all the costings, yes.  I cannot now recall whether financial issues entered into the commissioning of the architects — other than the matter of their fees, obviously. 

 

77.  Mr Campbell QC:  DLE must have then done their work once the feasibility studies were completed.

 

78.  Mr Brown:  They certainly did their work closely with the architectural practices, who were producing the studies.  Given the time pressures that were on us, I suspect that we would be asking DLE to interact with the architects, as their ideas were developing and crystallising.  But certainly, they produced their costing on the basis of the worked–up studies.

 

79.  Mr Campbell QC:  Thank you.

 

80.  Did you become aware, about 6 October, that Mr Clement, of DM Hall, from whom we heard yesterday, had written to your colleague, Anthony Andrew, and had suggested to him that Holyrood might be considered as a possible site?

 

81.  Mr Brown:  The first I knew of the possibility of the Holyrood site being available was in a copy of a letter that Hall sent to John Gibbons, and which John copied to me, and I saw that on 6 October.  Yes, there is a note from John Gibbons to several of us, including myself, and it encloses a letter to John Gibbons from John Clement of DM Hall; and that was the first that I recall being aware — I suppose I might say, as having refreshed my memory from looking at the files in preparation for the Inquiry.

 

82.  Mr Campbell QC:  How did you respond to that?

 

83.  Mr Brown:  I asked my colleague, Anthony Andrew, to check whether this was a real possibility.  I might say this was in the context of the Holyrood Road site being not the only site being offered speculatively by site owners, developers and also third parties in Edinburgh.

 

84.  Mr Campbell QC:  You mean aside from the three options, and Holyrood —

 

85.  Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

86.  Mr Campbell QC:  — other sites were being offered?

 

87.  Mr Brown:  Yes, other sites had been offered —

 

88.  Mr Campbell QC:  — had been offered, yes?

 

89.  Mr Brown:  Had been, yes.  I was aware that contacts had been made.

 

90.  Mr Campbell QC:  But you were not encouraging other contributors at this stage, were you?  You were working on a shortlist of three?

 

91.  Mr Brown:  Yes.  It is probably true to say that were not actively encouraging anyone else to come forward at that stage, although earlier in the process the Secretary of State had invited developers and site owners to make proposals — that would have been probably in June — and, in a sense, he had never withdrawn the offer.

 

92.  Mr Campbell QC:  But not repeated it either?

93.  Mr Brown:  He had not repeated it either, no.

 

94.  Mr Campbell QC:  Did you ask Mr Andrew to investigate Holyrood —

 

95.  Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

96.  Mr Campbell QC:  — following Mr Clement’s letter?

 

97.  Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

98.  Mr Campbell QC:  I think he in turn did that by organising the production of assessments, by, in the first place, architects instructed by Scottish & Newcastle.

 

99.  Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

100.          Mr Campbell QC:  And DM Hall themselves?

 

101.          Mr Brown:  Yes.  I certainly recollect the work undertaken by the architectural firm of Lewis & Hickey, who had been retained by S&N, I think, as part of the process of S&N thinking about future options for that site; because the company was certainly very conscious of its sensitivity, and they were concerned about what future use the site should be put to, and they had Lewis & Hickey instructed to help them with that thinking.

 

102.          Mr Campbell QC:  We can see elsewhere that the site had been rejected in an earlier sifting exercise — allegedly because it was constrained for reasons of traffic.  Was anything brought to your attention to shift that… that adverse criterion, I suppose we should call it?

 

103.          Mr Brown:  It is an interesting point that you make.  The reference in the City of Edinburgh Council’s analysis of the longlist sites — of which there were about 27, including, as the Inquiry has heard, Holyroodhouse…  but the assessment that that was a constrained site, I think, reflected the understanding that City of Edinburgh would have had at that stage that it was simply the Brewery building site that was for sale. 

 

104.          Now, the site that DM Hall had written to John Gibbons about was a significantly larger site than that, because it included Queensberry House and garden ground, and the buildings that surrounded that, which stretched all the way up to Reid’s Close.  So what was being offered now — and that was news to us — was the whole site, from Horse Wynd to Reid’s Close, and between Canongate and Holyrood Road.

 

105.          Mr Campbell QC:  You say it was news to you, even though we now know that Queensberry House had been acquired by S&N in 1996?

 

106.          Mr Brown:  Yes…  when that information came in from DM Hall that was news to us. I think we can deduce fairly confidently that it would have been news to City of Edinburgh Council too.

 

107.          Mr Campbell QC:  I am interested in your initial impression of this site being offered to you, Mr Brown.

 

108.          Mr Brown:  It is a little difficult for me now to sort of re-create in my mind what my initial impression would have been.  I can point the Inquiry towards some documentary evidence, which discusses the site early on.

 

109.          Mr Campbell QC:  I am sure you can, but can you try and answer my question first.

 

110.          Mr Brown:  Yes.  My initial impression was that this was more work for a hard-pressed team to do — to be perfectly frank — and, in particular, Anthony Andrew, who was busy with other issues relating to the three shortlisted sites; but it was, I think, clear enough to me from the Hall letter that there was some superficial feasibility about the site, and it would have to be investigated.  So it was an extra bit of work to do.  I do not recall a great light shining in my mind at the prospect of the Holyrood site being available.

 

111.          Mr Campbell QC:  So you instructed Mr Andrew to do some work.  Was it discussed on 17 November at the Steering Group?

 

112.          Mr Brown:  Yes, and prior to that, obviously there had been work done.  But, yes, it was discussed at the meeting that you refer to.

 

113.          Mr Campbell QC:  Let me just have one moment. 

 

114.          Mr Brown:  There is a minute of 19 November from Stuart Gilfillan.

 

115.          Mr Campbell QC:  SE/2/1760, please.

 

116.          Mr Brown:  Yes.  The discussion is on our agenda: item 3.

 

117.  Mr Campbell QC:  “Estate Services had examined the Holyrood Queensberry site along with Historic Scotland, Security Branch and other interests.  As with other sites there were clear advantages and disadvantages… Mr Elvidge supported the Council’s view that there would be major traffic impacts if roads were closed in the area.”

 

118.          What was Mr Elvidge’s interest in the matter at that stage?

 

119.          Mr Brown:  John Elvidge at that time would have been Head of, I think, Planning Group, in the Development Department.  He was certainly a Civil Service Under-Secretary in the Development Department, and I think his particular issue would be planning.  So he was interested in things like traffic and road layouts and so on.

 

2.45 pm

 

120.          Mr Campbell QC:  Is that all there is then, as at 17 November?

 

121.          Mr Brown:  That is the only documentary material I am aware of, and obviously there is the reference, too, to getting Bill Armstrong to examine the site and advise on building issues.

 

122.          Mr Campbell QC:  I think the next important thing, Mr Brown, was that you provided advice on 3 December, did you not?

 

123.          Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

124.          Mr Campbell QC:  Identifying Holyrood, only in slightly mysterious terms, and no doubt there were good reasons for that?

 

125.          Mr Brown:  There were reasons for us not identifying the site — two reasons, I think.  Firstly, we had been asked not to identify it —

 

126.          Mr Campbell QC:  Forgive me, could we go to SE/2/809? 

 

127.          Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

128.          Mr Campbell QC:  Can you tell me first of all why this minute is headed: “No further copies to be made”?

 

129.          Mr Brown:  I cannot tell you with absolute certainty, but, I think, from the content of the minute, it is reasonable to deduce that it was discussing the fourth site, as it was called.  Quite a lot of further copies have been made now.

 

130.          Mr Campbell QC:  We can see that at least three other copies have been made, for Barbara —  that must be Mrs Doig — Anthony Andrew and Bill Armstrong.

 

131.          Mr Brown:  Yes indeed.

 

132.          Mr Campbell QC:  I am sorry, that is not the most effective way of maintaining your security.

 

133.          However, could we go to the next page, at paragraph 6, on SE/2/810?

 

134.  “In addition we are continuing to assess the suitability of the fourth site of which Ministers are aware.”

 

135.          Now, just so I can fix this.  By writing in that way, are you maintaining Scottish & Newcastle’s request for confidentiality?

 

136.          Mr Brown:  Partly that, and, as I recall, we had been asked to maintain, as far as we could, the anonymity of the site.  Yes, I think that was the reason why the site is referred to in this way.

 

137.          There would also have been extremely strong media and public interest in knowing if a fourth site was under consideration, and clearly, at this stage, we were at a stage of consideration where Ministers had not made up their mind about whether the site was a fourth site, or was just somewhere on the periphery.

 

138.          Mr Campbell QC:  Was a decision taken on this day as to whether or not it should be announced publicly that it was a fourth site?

 

139.          Mr Brown:  I do not think that formally a decision was taken on that day.  I think the decision was taken on 7 December, which is, obviously, not very much later, but there is a minute from the Secretary of State’s Private Secretary, dated 8 December, which records discussion the previous day, where Ministers concluded that the site offered the possibility of a purpose-built Parliament building on a city-centre site.

 

140.          Mr Campbell QC:  Could you look at an e-mail, SE/2/807, please?  This is dated 4 December.  You appear to have been the author, and the e-mail appeared to have been forwarded three times.  You are writing to Barbara, and you write “A-ha, you are not surprised.”

 

141.          Mr Brown:  How interesting.  I have not seen this document before.

 

142.          Mr Campbell QC:  I am sorry to take you by surprise, Mr Brown.

 

143.          Mr Brown:  That is all right.

 

144.          Mr Campbell QC:  The reason I am asking you to look at it is that neither before nor after it, in the documents produced to the Inquiry, is there anything which obviously relates to it. 

 

145.          Mr Brown:  Is there no attachment to it in the documents?  Normally the e-mails have an attachment of some sort.  This one is a one-page minute top copy for Under-Secretary of State, who is of course Sir Russell Hillhouse.

 

146.          Mr Campbell QC:  So is that a reference to SE/2/808?

 

147.          Mr Brown:  Can I just look at this a second?  This is from… just interpreting our e-mail hieroglyphics.  This is a note from Robert Gordon’s PS — his personal secretary — to me, copied to Paul Grice, with a comment, I think, Mr Hamill, who was Head of Home Department or Justice Department at that time:

 

148.  “Should have included you in the circulation of this.”

 

149.          So the “this” is a one-page minute top copy for Under-Secretary of State.

 

150.          Mr Campbell QC:  OK.  Could you look at SE/2/808, please? 

 

151.          Mr Brown:  Right.

 

152.          Mr Campbell QC:  This is a minute from Mr Hamill.  Who was he?

 

153.          Mr Brown:  He was the Head of, I think, the Home Department, or the Justice Department, at that stage, subject to correction.  Can I just take time to read this?

 

154.          Mr Campbell QC:  Yes, please do.

 

155.          Mr Brown:  Yes, right.  I can understand the views being expressed.

 

156.          Mr Campbell QC:  Help me to understand it then.  Was Mr Hamill based in Saughton House?

 

157.          Mr Brown:  He was, yes.

 

158.          Mr Campbell QC:  Yes. And is his preoccupation here with having his own staff in the city centre as well as in Saughton?

 

159.          Mr Brown:  Yes.  He and his staff were asked to vacate St Andrew’s House, probably about 1995 or 1996 — we could find out the date for the Inquiry — to make room for the refurbishment of St Andrew’s House.  Do you want me to go into a little bit of detail about it?

 

160.          Mr Campbell QC:  No, I just want to know if I have understood correctly.  Mr Hamill is in Saughton, with his staff —

 

161.          Mr Brown:  With a promise that he gets back to the city centre once St Andrew’s House has been done up.

 

162.          Mr Campbell QC:  Ah, thank you.  That perhaps adds the piece in the jigsaw that is missing.

 

163.          Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

164.          Mr Campbell QC:  And Barbara Doig at that time was Director of Accommodation Services?

 

165.          Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

166.          Mr Campbell QC:  Why should she not be surprised, according to your e-mail?

 

167.          Mr Brown:  Yes, indeed…  Because, as I recall — and this is internal, rather opaque Scottish Office considerations — as I recall, the decision about which staff would move to fill up St Andrew’s House once its refurbishment had been completed had been left as a decision still to be taken by the office’s management group.  This was an attempt by Hamish Hamill, a perfectly understandable one, to stake his claim that it should be Justice Department staff who moved back and not somebody else; for example, Rural Affairs Department staff were out at Chesser, and I suppose they might have staked a claim to come back to St Andrew’s House.

 

168.          Mr Campbell QC:  So he was getting his toe in the door to get back into St Andrew’s House?

 

169.          Mr Brown:  He was staking his claim, yes.

 

170.          Mr Campbell QC:  Yes.

 

171.          Mr Brown:  I might add that the decision to move Justice Department staff out to Saughton was taken prior to… the decision was taken and the move was made prior to the election, and the other issues that then came into consideration about future uses of St Andrew’s House. This had not been a very recent thing.  They had been out a Saughton House for, I would think, a year anyway, by this time.  I will check that point for you and let you have a note of it, if that would be helpful.

 

172.          Just in case there is any misunderstanding, there is no relationship between this minute and my e-mail saying “A-ha”, and Holyrood.  You went straight from asking me about Holyrood to asking me about this e-mail —

 

173.          Mr Campbell QC:  Yes, I did, only because it comes in that order in my file.  But there is no relationship?

 

174.          Mr Brown:  There is no relationship.

 

175.          Mr Campbell QC:  Now that we see that it is linked to the memo from Mr Hamill.

 

176.          Mr Brown:  There is no link between Mr Hamill’s memo and the consideration of Holyrood as a site.

 

177.          Mr Campbell QC:  Thank you. 

 

178.          Before that distraction we were looking at your minute of 3 December, in which you had referred to Holyrood as a site “of which Ministers are aware”.  That is SE/2/810, please.

 

179.          Mr Brown:  Yes indeed.

 

180.          Mr Campbell QC:  You summarise in paragraph 6, what you know thus far, and then the rest of the minute deals with, first of all, the three sets of legal agreements, and then over the page, on SE/2/811, when you move on to issues of timing, can I take it that you are talking here about timing of an announcement of the winning site?

 

181.          Mr Brown:  Yes.  There is also a reference in paragraph 10, to timing in relation to the fourth site.  The point that was at issue here was that we had gone to a great deal of work with colleagues in the Scottish Office solicitor’s office to get draft legal agreements drawn up in respect of each of the three shortlisted sites, including delving into title and all that sort of thing. What I am saying here in paragraph 10 is obviously that no work had yet been done on preparing outline legal agreements in respect of Holyrood.  I do not actually mention timing there.  I am simply logging it as an issue that would have to be followed up. 

 

182.          Mr Campbell QC:  Yes.  And you then go on to consider timing in respect of Regent Road, Haymarket and Leith in the next three following paragraphs?

 

183.          Mr Brown:  Yes. 

 

184.          Mr Campbell QC:  You note on page SE/2/812, page 14:

 

185.  “In any event, further work is required”,

 

186.          and you return to Holyrood at 15, do you not?

 

187.          Mr Brown:  Yes, that is correct.

 

188.          Mr Campbell QC:

 

189.  “Were none of these locations to commend themselves and the Secretary of State were to favour the fourth site, a longer period of time would be required to put in place a legal agreement.”

 

190.          And you say:

 

191.  “It is unlikely to be possible to keep a lid on the issue for more than a week or two.” 

 

192.          Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

193.          Mr Campbell QC:  Now, did you have any idea at that time what sort of timescales you were looking at, if Holyrood were to be favourite?

 

194.          Mr Brown:  We certainly knew that the overall amount of time available for a decision to be made and announced was extremely limited.  I am not confident that on 3 December I was aiming for a very particular date in January, but subject to finding any other bit of evidence that allows me to be more specific, I think we can say simply that we were under a lot of pressure — understandably so — to move this forward as quickly as we could. 

 

195.          What I was doing here was flagging up the possibility that timing might be a bit of an issue, and we could not expect our colleagues in the legal service to do the impossible, although we regularly gave them the task of the very difficult.

 

196.          Mr Campbell QC:  The few minutes that follow deal with issues which are more properly the concern of Mr Andrew, but if we look at SE/2/796, which is Mr Thomson to Mr Gordon, copied, among others, to yourself —

 

197.          Mr Brown:  What is the date of that?

 

198.          Mr Campbell QC:  I am sorry, 8 December.  This is the Private Secretary, then, writing to you to discuss whether to undertake detailed feasibility studies of the Holyrood site?

 

199.          Mr Brown:  Writing to Robert Gordon, yes, and copied to me for action, I guess.

 

200.          Mr Campbell QC:  And did you take action on it?

 

201.          Mr Brown:  Yes.  Now, as regards the action, the immediate action obviously was to undertake some briefing of key people, and then to release a press notice, which emerged on the same day, 8 December.  That was one piece of action that had to be taken. 

 

202.          Mr Campbell QC:  Can we see what Mr Thomson says in the third paragraph?

 

203.  “Ministers decided that the addition of a fourth site to those under consideration should be announced as soon as possible, so that it did not appear an implausible rabbit from a hat at a later stage.”

 

204.          Now, I think I could be forgiven for suggesting that, in the light of that language from the normally very moderate Mr Thomson, perhaps he was reflecting the Secretary of State’s view that this was a godsent opportunity? 

 

205.          Mr Brown:  I could not really comment on that, Mr Campbell.  The Secretary of State and his advisers were very conscious that they had to manage the emergence into public knowledge of the fourth site. 

 

206.          Mr Campbell QC:  How did that sit with S&N’s pretty clear strictures on you to a) keep the matter confidential, and b) respect their need for a decant of their own main board and main office accommodation?

 

3.00 pm

 

207.          Mr Brown:  I had had meetings with S&N at senior level, at Group Chief Executive level, or I should say I had a meeting.  I cannot now recall whether I had more than one meeting, but I certainly recall a meeting.

 

208.          Mr Campbell QC:  Would that have been with Peter Stewart or Gordon Izatt, the Property Director?

 

209.          Mr Brown:  I think that my meeting was with Alec Rankin, but this is subject to correction.  There is a letter on the file; I am not sure if the Inquiry team can find it quickly — my recollection may be letting me down here — a letter promising to sell the site but I think, actually, that is in January 1998, rather than in December 1997.  That is a letter which, I think, has the correspondent’s name at the bottom, who is the individual at S&N with whom I was meeting.

 

210.          The point I was making was that I had had meetings at that senior level with S&N prior to the release of this information into the public domain so that S&N realised what was happening, and understood why it was happening, and were able to take whatever other measures they wanted.

 

211.          The great thing was that this site did not emerge without their prior knowledge.

 

212.          Mr Campbell QC:  For one thing, I think it is clear from John Clement’s letters and Lewis & Hickey’s letters that putting the fact that S&N were looking to move into the public domain put them at an immediate commercial disadvantage, did it not?  That was their view at least?

 

213.          Mr Brown:  That was their view of the situation, yes.  If the Holyrood site was to be considered, they appreciated why it was important to get that information into the public domain.

 

214.          Mr Campbell QC:  You think they understood that, do you?

 

215.          Mr Brown:  I believe that they did, yes.  And that it needed to be put into the public domain quickly to allow the further work that was needed to go ahead.

 

216.          Lord Fraser:  This minute of the 8th does not seem to give an answer to the question that you go on asking, which is:

 

217.  “Shall I undertake detailed feasibility studies at the Holyrood site?”

 

218.          Unless it is subsumed in the idea that as they had decided that the fourth site had to be announced as soon as possible, there was not going to be time for you to carry out any detailed feasibility studies.

 

219.          Mr Brown:  I do not know if, in the version of the document that you have… is there an attachment?

 

220.          Mr Campbell QC:  Yes, indeed, SE/2/797 and SE/2/798.

 

221.          Mr Brown:  Yes, there is a task list, which is at the very back.

 

222.          Mr Campbell QC:  SE/2/799.

 

223.          Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

224.          Mr Campbell QC:  Is that the one on the screen now?

 

225.          Mr Brown:  Yes, that is right.  That gives some idea of the actions that were discussed and agreed when officials, of whom I was not one, met the Secretary of State on 7 December —

 

226.          Mr Campbell QC:  Mr Brown, can I just interrupt you?  We have got Mr Thomson using this language — “implausible rabbit out of a hat”— and we have suddenly got very senior officials springing into action with a task list which you have shown us here — SE/2/799 — right from Robert Gordon downwards.

 

227.          I hope that I am not wrong in detecting at least a frisson of excitement around the senior group with the emergence of Holyrood as a possibility.  Now there may be nothing sinister about that — in fact I am sure there is not — but is it not right that, with the emergence of Holyrood and a decision to put it into the public domain, that people were suddenly re-energised into doing the best they could for the Holyrood proposal?

 

228.          Mr Brown:  That really is a matter of opinion.  You are asking me: was that my impression, working within the Scottish Office at this time and closely with that group of people?  I think what you have said would quite substantially overstate the case.  There is, I think, quite a bit of important information here which I do not have, although other witnesses to the Inquiry, I expect, would have, and that is: at what stage was a more detailed review of the Holyrood site commissioned? 

 

229.          Mr Campbell QC:  I am coming to that of course.  Look at SE/2/798 and tell me if I am exaggerating… the Secretary of State in this draft news release, third paragraph:

 

230.  “The site clearly has great potential.  We expect the cost of a building would bear comparison with the other sites under consideration.  There are a number of issues which need to be addressed and I have therefore commissioned similar studies of the Holyrood site to report by next week.  I am not saying Holyrood is the front runner, nor that it will be the final choice, but it clearly deserves to be considered alongside the others.”

 

231.          It is the old thing about a denial; if you see a denial you believe the opposite.  Am I wrong in reading all this into this series of pages?

 

232.          Mr Brown:  What you are asking me to do —

 

233.          Mr Campbell QC:  I am asking you to express an opinion really.

 

234.          Mr Brown:  You are asking me to cast my mind back and say: was this the state of mind of the Secretary of State and of the senior official team?  I could not say that.  My view on Holyrood, and I am reminded of it simply by reading the minute of 3 December is that it was a constrained site.  Much could be said either way; there were traffic issues, there had been, up until 3 December 1997, a doubt about whether it could accommodate the security requirements.  So, I certainly did not feel, personally, that Holyrood was a knight in shining armour, as it were, which had released us from difficult issues about the other sites.

 

235.          Mr Campbell QC:  Of course, there had been no environmental assessment?

 

236.          Mr Brown:  The detailed work had not at that stage produced any results.  It would be fair to say that here was a site which, on two counts, met the Secretary of State’s desire to see a new build and to see it in a city-centre location.  It was pretty clear to us from discussions with the Secretary of State that these were the criteria to which he probably attached most importance.  And it was undoubtedly true that Holyrood was a city-centre site, and that it would be cleared and would allow a new building to be erected.

 

237.          Lord Fraser:  Going back to my question to you, Mr Brown, from this press release, it says:

 

238.  “I have commissioned similar studies of the Holyrood site, to report by next week.”

 

239.          That is on the same timescale as the studies currently under way.  What does that mean?  That they are all going to get to the finishing line at the same time but, in respect of the other three sites, the feasibility studies had been under way for some considerable period, about two months?

 

240.          Mr Brown:  The precise dates, I do not have my fingers on.  Mr McLeish’s press release was dated 4 November, is that right?

 

241.          Mr Campbell QC:  That is correct.

 

242.          Mr Brown:  Did it announce all five studies?

 

243.          Mr Campbell QC:  I think we can see from that press release that

 

244.  “the Scottish Office have commissioned three architectural consultancy firms to carry out design feasibility studies”.

 

245.          Mr Brown:  Yes.  So by that date, all the architectural consultancies and the environmental impact assessment had been commissioned.  The fact is that, by at least 4 November, all that work was under way, which was one month prior.

 

246.          You are right to say that what this press release is saying is that Mr Dewar had asked for similar studies of Holyrood to be undertaken and to be finished at the same time as the others.

 

247.          Mr Campbell QC:  According to my information, the instructions to RMJM to carry out the Holyrood feasibility study were dated 11 December.  That letter is not scanned yet into the Inquiry papers, and it reads… and this is from Dr Gibbons and I will ask him about this:

 

248.  “The terms of the appointment will be as described in my letter of 11 November.”

 

249.          And that is a reference back to the Haymarket appointment of RMJM.

 

250.          Mr Brown:  11 November?

 

251.          Mr Campbell QC:  November.

 

252.          Mr Brown:  So that was a week after the McLeish press release?

 

253.          Mr Campbell QC:  Indeed.

 

254.          Mr Brown:  Which had announced that these studies had been set up?

 

255.          Mr Campbell QC:  Yes.  We will start the question again.  This is a letter dated 11 December and it says:

 

256.  “The terms of the appointment will be as described in my letter of 11 November and you agree to complete the feasibility study for consideration by the Secretary of State on 12 December”.

 

257.          One day later.  Now clearly that is not possible.  But we do know that, on 15 December, the Secretary of State had all four feasibility studies in front of him.  Do you agree with that?

 

258.          Mr Brown:  Yes, I do.  That is factually correct. 

 

259.          Mr Campbell QC:  Is it possible that RMJM were instructed before the date of this letter, orally, to do the feasibility study on Holyrood?

 

260.          Mr Brown:  I think that is highly possible and clearly a question, as you have indicated, that would have to be put to Dr Gibbons.  I think it is also possible — again Dr Gibbons might be able to say; I can only speculate — that some work had begun as early as the date of the Secretary of State’s decision, which was 8 December. 

 

261.          Mr Campbell QC:  Dr Gibbons goes on to say — I will show you this copy:

 

262.  “The study will be based on applying the knowledge gained on the Haymarket proposal.”

 

263.          Could that mean that RMJM were to draw on their knowledge of the building user brief which had been sent to them earlier on?

 

264.          Mr Brown:  Absolutely, yes.  The task that was given to RMJM… I think they had nearer a week than a day in which to undertake the task, and Dr Gibbons can advise you on that.  I am quite clear that the task that we gave them depended heavily on the fact that they had familiarised themselves with the brief and the requirements in preparing the study for Haymarket.

 

265.          Mr Campbell QC:  I do not think it is appropriate, really, is it Mr Brown, to look at the feasibility studies with you, but with Dr Gibbons?

 

266.          Mr Brown:  I would agree with that.

 

267.          Mr Campbell QC:  In any event, is it correct that there was a presentation of the studies on 15 December?

 

268.          Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

269.          Mr Campbell QC:  Was that a matter which was later written up by Mr Thomson some time in January?

 

270.          Mr Brown:  Yes it was.  The presentation of the feasibility studies on 15 December — 15 December was a Monday — was preceded by a wodge of paper from myself to the Secretary of State and Mr McLeish on the 12th.

 

271.          Mr Campbell QC:  And that wodge would consist of a long minute from yourself, I think a minute from Dr Gibbons in respect of an architectural competition and a minute from Bob Gordon about PFI?

 

272.          Mr Brown:  No.  I am sorry, just let me find this.  My minute of 12 December was all about site selection, design feasibility and cost studies: “Alistair Brown to PS Secretary of State, 12 December, with annexes”.

 

273.          Mr Campbell QC:  SE/2/1071, yes.

 

274.          Mr Brown:  This was weekend reading for the Secretary of State and Mr McLeish before the presentations on the Monday.  Among other things, it gave a running timetable for the four presentations that were to be held on the Monday; that is in Annex A.  It provided information on costs of each of the options in Annexes B to E, and lined these up side by side in Annex F so that Ministers could have a look at these comparatively.

 

275.          Mr Campbell QC:  Can we look at Annex F, please?  Sorry, that is SE/2/1080.  What are we looking at there?

 

276.          Mr Brown:  We are looking at Annex F to the advice that I put up on 12 December.

 

277.          And that had the benefit of a report from Davis Langdon and Everest.

 

278.          Mr Campbell QC:  Into the four feasibility studies?

 

279.          Mr Brown:  Yes, as far as I recall.  Obviously, they must have moved very quickly to give us a costing of the Holyrood option by then, but I have said in my note that

 

280.  “The estimated building costs shown in the annexes are drawn from work undertaken by the independent cost consultants, DLE.”

 

3.15 pm

 

281.          Mr Campbell QC:  Right, could you look, please, at SE/2/1351, which is the third page of the Executive summary of DLE’s cost report on these four options?

 

282.          Is that a page that begins:

 

283.  “Holyrood: a very rapid and broad assessment of cost has been undertaken for this location”?

 

284.          Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

285.          Mr Campbell QC:  And we see there:

 

286.  “The scheme, as currently outlined, totals 20,070 square metres, including a basement et cetera.  The estimated total cost is £49·5 million.”

 

287.          Mr Brown: Yes.

 

288.          Mr Campbell QC:  And that matches the figure in your Annex F, does it not?

 

289.          Mr Brown:  Yes it does.  So that is corroboration, really, that that is where I drew that figure from.

 

290.          Mr Campbell QC:  Yes.  Were you able, in the time available, Mr Brown, to make any study of the main report by DLE, in respect of Holyrood?

 

291.          Mr Brown:  I do not recall precisely what I did in preparing the written material dated 12 December.  The DLE study — obviously, DLE, a firm of skilled quantity surveyors — would have been very much the province of my colleagues in the Construction and Building Control Group.  And if I had prepared this advice in line with the way that I was accustomed to doing the earlier advice to Ministers, it would have been a matter of my circulating a sort of framework — an outline of this — and asking colleagues to contribute to it.

 

292.          Mr Campbell QC:  Yes, I am just anxious to look at the facts, as we know them, Mr Brown, not to take any conclusions from them at the moment.  Could you look at SE/2/1391, please?

 

293.          This is the facing page of the main part of DLE’s report, which is quite a chunky document; I have it here in my hand, for all four sites.

 

294.          Mr Brown: Yes.

 

295.          Mr Campbell QC:  And this is the facing page of the section which deals with Holyrood.  Can I draw your attention to the fourth paragraph:

 

296.  “RMJM and DLE were asked to consider Holyrood as an additional site to the three sites in the original feasibility appraisal.  Holyrood was introduced during the latter part of the period available for the study…”

 

297.          — that is an understatement, if ever there was one —

 

298.  “…and, as a consequence, less time has been available for its consideration.”

 

299.          Now, it is the next-but-one paragraph that I am interested in exploring with you:

 

300.  “Based on DLE published indices, the figure of £49·53 million would be projected to an out-turn cost of £57·36 million.”

 

301.          Mr Brown: Yes.

 

302.          Mr Campbell QC:  Can you help me with an understanding of what is meant by:

 

303.  “Based on DLE published indices”?

 

304.          Mr Brown:  This is in the province of quantity surveying, and building cost indexes, or indices.  So that is outside my area of competence.  I could make a suggestion that this reflects estimated building cost inflation over the projected timescale of the building project.  That would be my interpretation, rather than an authoritative view.

 

305.          Mr Campbell QC:  So the real answer is no, this is not within your area of expertise.

 

306.          Mr Brown:  That is correct, yes.

 

307.          Mr Campbell QC:  But we do see there — and can you confirm this — figures of £49·5 million, set against a projected out-turn cost of £57·3?

 

308.          Mr Brown: Yes.

 

309.          Mr Campbell QC:  Somebody was saying here at 15 December 1997, based on the DLE indices, this was a building that was going to cost £57·3 million.

 

310.          Mr Brown:  In out-turn terms, yes.  And, presumably… well, just let me say then that the figure of £49·5 million, which is the capital cost of the estimated building cost of Holyrood, and which is reflected in Annex F to the submission of 12 December.  I assume, and I would be extremely disappointed if this were not the case, that the corresponding figures of £53 million for Haymarket, £59 million for Leith, and £65 million for Regent Road are on the same basis, and that there would be correspondingly higher figures for each of these three options, on a projected out-turn basis.  If that were not the case, then I would want to know about that.

 

311.          Mr Campbell QC:  Well, I think the figures are somewhat different, but we are not concerned with Haymarket, and you have already made it clear that this is not your area of expertise so I will take it up with other witnesses.  I just wanted to deal with it today since it seems to fit with this chapter of your evidence.

 

312.          Mr Brown: Right.

 

313.          Mr Campbell QC:  Can I just understand the expression “out-turn cost”?  Can you help me with that?

 

314.          Mr Brown:  Normally, in the public sector, when we discuss out-turn costs, we mean the actual cash cost of a project, and, obviously, when it is a multi-year project, that means that spending has been incurred at different… cash spending has been incurred.  One simply adds up the total, and that gives one the out-turn cost.  But in terms of being able to compare the cost of different projects, then what one normally does in these cases is to rebase the costs to a single point in time, using in this case a building cost deflator.

 

315.          Mr Campbell QC:  So that is a mathematical exercise so that you have like with like.

 

316.          Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

317.          Mr Campbell QC:  I am holding in my hand a document called ‘Scottish Parliament Building Feasibility Study: Holyrood Site, December 1997’.  Because of its size, it has not been scanned into the Inquiry’s documents.  Do you know if RMJM produced anything other than that in respect of Holyrood?  And I will let you see it.

 

318.          Mr Brown:  Thank you.  I think the answer to your question is that I am not aware of anything further on paper being produced by RMJM.  They may have had further material that they brought to the presentations on 15 December.  I cannot now recall whether, for example, they had large-scale photographs on vertical standing boards and so on.  But, as far as I was aware, and obviously this is six years ago now, there is no other documentary evidence on the papers that I have reviewed.  This would be what RMJM produced.

 

319.          Mr Campbell QC:  Well, I dare say there were lots of other working papers and so forth.  It does appear, does it not, from the memorandum of 12 December that it was your understanding that RMJM had been working hand in hand with DLE in the short time that they had for the feasibility study?

 

320.          Mr Brown:  Well now, what I have said to you is that the building costs shown are drawn from the work undertaken by DLE Ltd.  I am not sure if I would necessarily say that they were working very closely with the architectural consultants.  Having said that, it would be my expectation that they would be able to derive sufficient information from the architectural consultants to do their job properly.

 

321.          Mr Campbell QC:  Well, we can no doubt ask Dr Gibbons about that.  He may have more knowledge.

 

322.          Now, let us try to assess for Lord Fraser the maximum amount of time that RMJM could have had to produce the feasibility study for Holyrood.  I showed you a letter dated the 11th, which was a letter of instructions.  And we know that the study was presented on the 15th.  I have speculated with you that there might have been oral instructions before that, but we know, do we not, that Mr McLeish’s news conference… remind of the date of that again.

 

323.          Mr Brown:  4 November, I think.

 

324.          Mr Campbell QC:  4 or 5 November.  And we know that the decision to add Holyrood to the list —

 

325.          Mr Brown:  Was taken on 7 December.

 

326.          Mr Campbell QC:  7 December?

 

327.          Mr Brown: December, yes, at 3.30 pm according to Ken Thomson’s minute.

 

328.          Mr Campbell QC:  Well, no doubt that reflects his precise nature.  Am I being ungenerous when I speculate that the maximum time which could have been available would be one week — the 7th to the 15th?

 

329.          Mr Brown:  Yes, that is certainly what the documentary material suggests.  The only qualification that I would suggest to that — and it could be explored with Dr Gibbons — is whether any earlier indication had been given to RMJM.  Now, that seems to me unlikely because we had given quite an assurance to Scottish & Newcastle that people outside the Scottish Office would not know about this until it was announced publicly.  So I think what you are saying is right.

 

330.          Mr Campbell QC:  OK.  I must ask you, Mr Brown, did that appear to you to be entirely satisfactory?

 

331.          Mr Brown:  In judging whether it was an adequate period of time, I and others — Robert Gordon and, no doubt, the Secretary of State as well — would have been guided by the view of Dr Gibbons, who could, I think, reasonably be expected to have a view as to whether a practice of the size and competence of RMJM could get a grip of this piece of work within that very short period of time.  John Gibbons would be able to tell you what his assessment was.  Obviously, it is a very short period of time.  On the other hand, RMJM had become familiar with the building brief, and with solving the architectural problems at Haymarket, which was a site of approximately the same square area as Holyrood.

 

332.          Mr Campbell QC:  But without buildings on it?

 

333.          Mr Brown: It was a clear site; that is right. Yes.

 

334.          Mr Campbell QC:  I should make it clear, Mr Brown, these questions are not in any way designed to reflect on the integrity of professional skills of RMJM; they are simply designed to find out the facts.  We have a week, we are agreed, I think, that a week seems to have been the maximum period available to them.  Is that right?

 

335.          Mr Brown:  Yes, as far as I know.

 

336.          Mr Campbell QC:  You had urged caution on the Secretary of State before, in coming to a decision before he had an adequate amount of information, if I may say so, in a very comprehensive way.  One of the things that was apparently missing for Holyrood was any form of environmental impact assessment [EIA].  You had urged on him earlier not to proceed to a decision among Regent Road, Leith or Haymarket until he had an EIA, and you told us that Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick were instructed to do that.

 

337.          Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

338.          Mr Campbell QC:  Am I right in understanding that there was no such EIA available for Holyrood when the meeting took place on 15 December?

 

339.          Mr Brown:  That is an absolutely clear question of fact, and I think I might have to say that I do not know the answer, but will obviously find out, and, if it is acceptable, will provide that information to the Inquiry.  Can I just look at the terms of the press release that was attached to Ken Thomson’s minute of 8 December?  It says, under “key messages”,

 

340.  “have also extended traffic and environmental studies to include this site”.

 

341.          And in the draft press release that is attached; I do not actually have the final-form press release — I take it it would be the same — Mr Dewar says:

 

342.  “I have therefore commissioned similar studies of the Holyrood site.”

 

343.          And that includes cost and transport environmental impact in the previous sentence.  So we clearly commissioned SWK to expand its traffic and environmental impact assessment to include Holyrood, so I am pretty clear from that that the answer to your question is yes, such a study — an extension to existing studies — was commissioned.

 

344.          I do not know when the Scottish Office received the SWK material.  What I can say is that as soon as it was public knowledge that Holyrood was under consideration, we worked very closely with the City of Edinburgh Council on the Holyrood site.  And there is a piece of paper which is before the Inquiry, it has the number E/1/385 at the top right-hand corner; it is dated 12 December 1997, and it is from City of Edinburgh Council, headed up “Scottish Parliament Site Options: Confidential Observations”.

 

3.30 pm

 

345.          Mr Campbell QC:  SE/2/1045, please. 

 

346.          Mr Brown:  If you go to page 5 of that document, in paragraph 7.4 —

 

347.          Mr Campbell QC:  Now, just to understand what we are looking at first of all.

 

348.          Mr Brown:  Yes, sure.

 

349.          Mr Campbell QC:  I am just not sure if that immediately ties in with the earlier page.  I think it does.  Anyway, where do you want me to look?  Paragraph 5?

 

350.          Mr Brown:  Well, I would draw your attention, having glanced again at the first page, at the summary.  Paragraphs 1 to 5 provide a summary, but then paragraph 7.4 provides the City of Edinburgh Council’s commentary on Holyrood at that point.

 

351.          Mr Campbell QC:  Right.  And the point you want to make is?

 

352.          Mr Brown:  The point I wanted to make was that, as well as whatever environmental impact assessment we had from SWK, and I cannot tell the Inquiry sitting here when we received that, although I am very clear that we commissioned it.  As well as that, we had this, I think, informal but well-informed assessment from City of Edinburgh Council.  I recall that City of Edinburgh Council had provided a lot of the data on which SWK and Ironside Farrar’s traffic and environmental impact assessment work was based.

 

353.          So the consultants SWK were working closely with City of Edinburgh Council on the assessment of the three sites first of all and then, I think we can infer, on the fourth site.

 

354.          Mr Campbell QC:  This document at SE/2/1045 is headed “Confidential observations following presentations of the four site proposals”.

 

355.          Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

356.          Mr Campbell QC:  It finishes up on page SE/2/1050 unsigned, but with the initials “AH/IS”.

 

357.          Mr Brown:  Yes.  Sorry, there is a date on the copy that I have —

 

358.          Mr Campbell QC:  Indeed.

 

359.          Mr Brown:  Friday 12 December, which was the same date, of course, as my advice and the actual presentation from the architects of the four site proposals was on the 15th. 

 

360.          Mr Campbell QC:  Yes.  As you have already said, this is weekend reading for Ministers.

 

361.          Mr Brown:  That is right.

 

362.          Mr Campbell QC:  Who is “AH”?

 

363.          Mr Brown:  That is Andrew Holmes, and IS is Ian Spence.  Their names appear in paragraph 2 of the document before the Inquiry.

 

364.          Mr Campbell QC:  So we know, therefore, that these are officials of the City of Edinburgh Council.  Can we look at page SE/2/049, please, and see what they say about Holyrood.

 

365.  “Less time has been available to date both for the preparation of this proposal and reaction to it, initial observations lead to the conclusion that it is certainly a viable site… the site can comfortably accommodate the Parliament building”

 

366.          — although, it has to be said, not yet designed.

 

367.          “Further design development can lead to a site-sensitive building form… Two areas are particularly significant:  The eastern extremity of the Royal Mile, and the open area to the south… The incorporation of an ‘improved’ Queensberry House… is… a great asset.  The proposal would ensure the regeneration of the eastern sector of the Old Town”,

 

368.  “Transport issues will require some consideration but it is highly probable that the immediate street network around the site could be successfully adjusted if necessary.  We have seen no consultants assessment of the site but there appear to be two basic issues.  The site is poorly located for public transport and there would need to be a fairly robust connection to Waverley and to links to the airport… there is no ‘strategic’ solution beyond a local shuttle bus and improving the pedestrian linkages.”

 

369.          Over the page at SE/2/1050:

 

370.  “Traffic management is dominated by the need to reduce traffic around the site curtilage.”

 

371.          And three streets are mentioned.

 

372.          Now, you took me to this document.  Would Ministers have had this document or would it have been fed into advice?

 

373.          Mr Brown:  There is no evidence on the files that we sent this to Ministers as it is.  I think that the sense of this document, although certainly not the detail, is reflected in the advice that I gave on 12 December and then again on 6 January.

 

374.          Sorry, I am just looking quickly at the minute of 12 December to see what we said.

 

375.          Mr Campbell QC:  I have to say, Mr Brown, I do not see anything in this which immediately mirrors the advice given by Mr Holmes and Mr Spence.

 

376.          Mr Brown:  No, I accept that as fair.  I have also just noticed a point which I would draw to your attention; that in paragraph 3 of the minute of 12 December, the following words appear: 

 

377.  “The results of the work on transport and environmental impact were presented on Friday afternoon, 12 December, and are reflected in the Annexes to this minute.”

 

378.          Now, I am quite clear that if the Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick work had only covered Leith, Haymarket and Regent Road, I would have said so at that point in paragraph 3.  The fact that I did not say so makes clear to me that SWK’s work at that stage included an assessment of Holyrood.

 

379.          Sorry, I can give you another bit of evidence now, reminding myself of what is written into the Annexes of the minute of the 12th.  There is a sort of 10-word summary of environmental impact, and that makes it quite clear that Regent Road — St Andrew’s House — is the most environmentally benign.  And under Holyrood it says “benign”, but by implication not so benign as St Andrew’s House, Regent Road.  Then it adds:

 

380.  “Seen as solving a potential urban environment problem.”

 

381.          From all of that, I think I would conclude that we did have information from SWK.  I have not found a copy of it on the files that I have, but a copy will be available, I am sure.

 

382.          Mr Campbell QC:  A one-word summary of an EIA is perhaps a little terse.

 

383.          Mr Brown:  Perhaps a little terse.

 

384.          Mr Campbell QC:  This advice went to Ministers on 12 December —

 

385.          Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

386.          Mr Campbell QC:  — which was a Friday, as you have told us.  Was it the following week that there was a meeting, I think on the 15th?

 

387.          Mr Brown:  Yes.  On the Monday.

 

388.          Mr Campbell QC:  For what purpose?

 

389.          Mr Brown:  Sorry, can you give me just a short minute to put my hands on the minute that summarises that discussion.  And the minute I am looking for is Ken Thomson’s of 16 January.  Ken had got round to summarising that meeting on 16 January. 

 

390.          The purpose of the discussion was to reflect on the presentations made throughout Monday 15th. 

 

391.          Mr Campbell QC:  It is SE/2/1253.

 

392.          Mr Brown:  The meeting took place, as I recall, in the evening, or certainly the late afternoon, of Monday 15th, after the four architectural consultants — three different ones — had presented their four schemes for the four alternative sites.

 

393.          Mr Campbell QC:  You will recall, Mr Brown, won’t you, that this minute was written after the announcement of Holyrood?

 

394.          Mr Brown:  Yes, indeed.  That is true.  Nevertheless, it is the best documentary account that we have of what was discussed.

 

395.          Mr Campbell QC:  Which bit of it do you want us to look at?

 

396.          Mr Brown:  Oh, sorry.  I was attempting to answer your question as to what was the purpose of the meeting on the 15th.  And my answer is:  we can see from the minute of 16 January what was discussed, but its purpose in my mind was to follow up with the Secretary of State the presentations that he had seen and to see whether he had any further questions, and to help him make up his mind about a choice of site for the Parliament. 

 

397.          Mr Campbell QC:  Did you form an impression on 15 December that he had made up his mind?

 

398.          Mr Brown:  No.  I would say quite clearly that he had not made up his mind after seeing the presentations on the 15th.  I think that he was impressed by each of the presentations that he had seen.  I recall that he was greatly impressed, for example, by Page and Park’s view of what could be achieved at St Andrew’s House and Regent Road. 

 

399.          He was also obviously struck by the fact that it was feasible to build a building of the size then thought necessary on the Holyrood site.  But it was not my impression that he had made up his mind, and I think I could do no more than simply point to the words in Ken Thomson’s minute of 16 January that Holyrood emerged as a very strong contender.  And then it says: 

 

400.  “Before the Secretary of State made his final decision… he required further information, particularly in relation to the Holyrood site.”

 

401.          Mr Campbell QC:  That is SE/2/1254, isn’t it?  The bottom paragraph there on the screen.

 

402.          Mr Brown:  Yes, that is correct.

 

403.          Mr Campbell QC:  He highlights three issues which, for him, still required to be confirmed or rejected.

 

404.          Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

405.          Mr Campbell QC:  Traffic, the attitude of the Palace and the possibility of extending the site further.

 

406.          Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

407.          Mr Campbell QC:  Was there any nervousness at that time, Mr Brown, about the size of the site in relation to a proposal for 15,000 square metres or so?

 

408.          Mr Brown:  No, there was not.  The site at Holyrood was actually slightly bigger, by my recollection, than the site at Haymarket, about which no concern had been raised.  And the Haymarket site had a corner, sort of constrained by the railway tunnels under the site.  So there was that bit of evidence that helped us — or helped the people with skill — to be satisfied about that.

 

409.          I also recall, although I do not think I could now put my finger on the piece of paper, that the assessment of the Holyrood site suggested that a building substantially larger than the 16,000 square metres then briefed could be placed on the site.

 

410.          Mr Campbell QC:  I think I said 15,000 to you earlier on, but it was actually 16,000 by then, wasn’t it?

 

411.          Mr Brown:  It was certainly 16,000 by about this time.

 

412.          Lord Fraser:  In his evidence, Mr Grice said to us, if I have noted it correctly, that at that meeting on the 15th, he agreed with your ultimate conclusion that the Secretary of State had not made up his mind but he had this to say:  “He went a long way to making up his mind.”

 

413.          Now, would that not be a fair enough assessment?

 

414.          Mr Brown:  I would hesitate to say that.  Clearly, that was Paul Grice’s impression and he was at least as close to this by that time, I think, as I was.  This is a question, obviously, that turns on my recollection of events that are now six years ago.  If I had been gossiping, which I would not have done, with somebody who was anxious to know what the Secretary of State was thinking, I think I would have said that his mind had not yet been made up.  He had been impressed by Page and Park and St Andrew’s House; he had been impressed by the attractions of the Holyrood site.  He was going to take the New Year holiday to conclude.

 

415.          Just in case it is of any significance:  the figure of 16,000 square metres is in paragraph 8 of my minute of 12 December, and it is included in a series of explanations of why building costs have escalated from the original £40 million included in the White Paper.

 

416.          Mr Campbell QC:  We are looking at paragraph 8 on page SE/2/1072. Is that the paragraph?

 

417.          Mr Brown: Yes it is, and you will see the figure of 16,000 square metres about halfway down there.

 

418.          Mr Campbell QC: Right. So let us just pick this apart a little bit and see what the signposts are. First of all, the advice is predicated entirely, is it not, on DLE’s work?

 

3.45 pm

 

419.          Mr Brown: Yes. Just to take you back one further paragraph, Mr Campbell, to paragraph 7 (SE/2/1072). It is a general set of qualifications, as it were, on the estimated building costs. It does make the point, which I suppose I am relieved to see, that we said actual costs would depend heavily on the eventual design selected and so on. Nevertheless, this was the best basis that we had for comparison.

 

420.          Mr Campbell QC: All right. I am happy to read these two together, the first being general and the second particular.

 

421.          Mr Brown: Yes, correct.

 

422.          Mr Campbell QC: The table covers site acquisition, estimated building costs, dependent on design, quality, finishes, fitting out and the procurement route chosen —

 

423.          Mr Brown: Yes.

 

424.          Mr Campbell QC: — estimated running costs of the Parliament and the likely costs on the Scottish Office estate. Why did you highlight the procurement route there?

 

425.          Mr Brown: I am not sure if I can answer that. It is quite possible, although by no means certain, that that section of the advice would have been commented on by John Gibbons. That is a question that could be asked, obviously, of Dr Gibbons. I take full responsibility for the list because this minute is mine, but I might well have included at least some of these on the basis of advice from Construction and Building Control Group.

 

426.          Mr Campbell QC: Can I just highlight them, so that we see where they are. We have read paragraph 7, and in number 8 the building costs appear to be entirely predicated on DLE’s advice to you.

 

427.          Mr Brown: Yes, that would be correct.

 

428.          Mr Campbell QC: We are agreed, are we not, I should not look at that with you because it is not your area?

 

429.          Mr Brown: Correct. Thank you.

 

430.          Mr Campbell QC: The estimates include fitting out, which is to say plant and equipment, fixed furniture, catering equipment, but exclude fees and VAT.

 

431.          Mr Brown: Yes.

 

432.          Mr Campbell QC: And those figures are shown separately.

 

433.          Mr Brown: Yes.

 

434.          Mr Campbell QC: They all exceed £40 million, which is the figure in the White Paper, and then you give a number of reasons. First of all, a smaller footprint, 12,000 square metres, not 16,000 square metres; secondly, visits to Parliaments had indicated a high quality of construction — the High Court standard, in other words — and you say —

 

435.  “we allowed a cost per area figure for estimating purposes which equated to High Court standard for the main public areas of the building, and a lower (although adequate) standard for office space, meeting rooms etc. The designers and cost consultants have applied a higher standard throughout the building, allowing a higher specification of finishes and fittings etc… This will improve the ‘presence’ of the building.”

 

436.          So that is two things, and then we move on to look at a third, which is the issue of secure car parking. If we go to the next page (SE/2/1073), you say there was no allowance for parking in the £40 million. Then there is the question of indexation.

 

437.          Mr Brown: There is, yes.

 

438.          Mr Campbell QC: That is right. But at 12 December you are still saying it could be done close to £40 million if economies were made.

 

439.          Mr Brown: Yes, although I go on at the end of paragraph 10 to say that that would increase a construction cost figure of £40 million with VAT and fees to £52 million to £55 million, including VAT and fees.

 

440.          Mr Campbell QC: I wonder, with hindsight, if you were telling him… It does not seem to me to be your style, if I may say so, but you weren’t telling him here what he wanted to hear, were you?

 

441.          Mr Brown: I thought it was our duty to remind him, or to point out to him, that the costs now had moved this much above where they were at the beginning and to explain to him why that was. What paragraph 10 does, at the end of that explanation, is to say that, were we to track back to the £40 million figure in the White Paper, then we would have to go for a smaller Parliament with cheaper finishes and no, or very little, car parking. But even if we did that, once we have added fees and VAT, which after all was included in the £40 million figure used in the White Paper, we would be up to £52 million to £55 million.

 

442.          Mr Campbell QC: It is a matter of detail on this page, paragraph 13. This is a paragraph headed “Running Costs”. You say in the last sentence:

 

443.  “In contrast costs at Leith have risen because of the current proposal to separate by around quarter of a mile the Parliament building from the existing office at Victoria Quay, and because of higher notional rent.”

 

444.          As I say, it is a matter of detail. This question of separation, is that something that comes to you from the Benson and Forsyth proposals?

 

445.          Mr Brown: Yes, yes it was. At that point, one has to cast one’s mind back to what that bit of Leith looked like in 1997. There were large swathes of undeveloped land to the north and west of Victoria Quay. The first proposal that had emerged in our minds had been that the Parliament might be quite close to Victoria Quay, in which case it could share, for example, the security perimeter, and that would reduce running costs. They placed the Parliament building more or less on a site that projected into the water area, and that was about a quarter of a mile from Victoria Quay. Simply, the implication of that for running costs is that you cannot amalgamate the security operations, physical security.

 

446.          Mr Campbell QC: Can I just show you this drawing, which is not scanned, from the summary of the Benson and Forsyth report. And can we see Victoria Quay there and the Parliament complex there?

 

447.          Mr Brown: That would be about quarter of a mile away, I think, yes, in that region.

 

448.          Mr Campbell QC: Thank you. So by the use of the proposal there, you are not actually talking about a proposal; you are talking about an indication from Benson and Forsyth.

 

449.          Mr Brown: Yes, although I think it is maybe just worth noting that one of the concerns about the Leith site was how to create impact and civic presence in a flat working dockland area. Benson and Forsyth’s proposals on that front were keenly awaited, and they felt that the building needed this water-edge site to create that civic presence.

 

450.          Mr Campbell QC: Right. Since we are concerned with costs, can we look at paragraph 14, at the foot:

 

451.  “At Holyrood, a First Minister’s office could appropriately be established in Queensberry House… at an additional cost of about £4 million.”

 

452.          It may be hard for you to remember, but additional to what?

 

453.          Mr Brown: Just let me remind myself of Annex E (SE/2/1079), which notes Holyrood costs. This would have been in addition to the building cost of £49·5 million, which is quoted as the building cost for Holyrood.

 

454.          Mr Campbell QC: And did you intend the reader to understand that Queensberry House could be brought into practical use for £4 million?

 

455.          Mr Brown: Yes, that clearly was my intention when I wrote this minute that something like £4 million would be required to refurbish and repair Queensberry House.

 

456.          Mr Campbell QC: Indeed we can see, can we not, from Annex E that the site conditions box at the top includes Queensberry House?

 

457.          Mr Brown: Yes.

 

458.          Mr Campbell QC: The £49·5 million stands alone, not including the £4 million for Queensberry House.

 

459.          Mr Brown: Yes, that is the clear meaning here.

 

460.          Mr Campbell QC: Yes, thank you. Might you not have included a box for Queensberry House?

 

461.          Mr Brown: I should say that, obviously, that is included in the text, so it was made known to Ministers. Where it might have been found was in any discussion of ancillary costs, such as accommodation for the First Minister, which we expected would vary depending on which site was chosen for the Parliament. There is, I think, some discussion of this in, further up the page at paragraph 14, where we say that if Leith were chosen, then we would assume that the First Minister’s office would have to be near the Parliament.

 

462.          Mr Campbell QC: I see that, but you are putting the material into a table to make it easier for the Minister, at the weekend, to digest it, are you not?

 

463.          Mr Brown: Yes.

 

464.          Mr Campbell QC: Queensberry House does not appear there.

 

465.          Mr Brown: It does not appear in the table, no. It is worth just pointing out that what it says about Queensberry is a “could” rather than a “should”. Could I also draw your attention to Annex F (SE/2/1080), which attempts to summarise all of the costing figures. You will notice that in the fifth row, with a side title “Consequential estate costs (capital)”, the words “inc FMO” appear in brackets, and that is a shorthand for “including First Minister’s Office”.

 

466.          Mr Campbell QC: Yes.

 

467.          Mr Brown: At Holyrood the £15 million to £20 million rises by £4·4 million if it includes the First Minister’s Office. This is a bit condensed, but what it is saying is that in the final summary we included an allowance for the cost of Queensberry House. In all the rows below that, leading on to the discounted cash-flow analysis over 20 years and 60 years — “inc FMO” is shown separately in Annex F.

 

468.          Mr Campbell QC: I am probably nitpicking, but Annex E does not include Queensberry House.

 

469.          Mr Brown: That is true.

 

470.          Mr Campbell QC: You make it clear that it was there, however.

 

471.          Mr Brown: It was there, and it is shown in Annex F.

 

472.          Mr Campbell QC: Clearly, Ministers have to be very alert when they are reading their weekend papers. Mr Brown, we have been at this for quite a long time now. I would like to take one more minute, Sir, if I may, and you might be able to give me an indication when you would like to rise.

 

473.          Lord Fraser: I would like to finish this evening. Are we going to manage that?

 

474.          Mr Campbell QC: Yes, I think so. I have not canvassed with Mr Brown the possibility of returning, but I think it may be more convenient to ask him to do that.

 

475.          Lord Fraser: I would like to rise at 4.30 pm. It has been a long day to be answering questions.

 

476.          Mr Campbell QC: Are you still content for me to go on for five or 10 minutes longer?

 

477.          Mr Brown: Certainly, yes.

 

478.          Mr Campbell QC: I think the next instalment in this matter, Mr Brown, is the lengthy minute of 6 January 1998. You must have got sick of churning out the same information time and time again, in different forms. Why was it necessary to do it again on 6 January?

 

479.          Mr Brown: That is a fair question. Clearly there was some information that the Secretary of State requested; it is the information that Ken Thomson listed in his minute of 16 January, retrospectively, and we needed to provide that to him. I think we were also anxious to make sure that the Secretary of State had the most accurate and up-to-date information that we could provide. That meant the need, for example, to provide the cost information over again.

 

4.00 pm

 

480.          But the bulk of what I accept is rather a weighty submission on 6 January to do with traffic and related issues around Holyrood, as far as I remember, and there is a section on the results of the transport and environmental impact study.

 

481.          Mr Campbell QC:  It is fair to say, is it not, that the bulk of this minute is about Holyrood?

 

482.          Mr Brown:  Yes, and that fairly reflects what the Secretary of State asked for.  It says in Ken’s retrospective note that—

 

483.  “before he made his final decision, the Secretary of State considered that he required further information, particularly in relation to Holyrood”.

 

484.          And you have already gone through these pieces of information that included traffic issues, the view of the royal household — the Palace, as we called it — and timing at which the site would become available.  Now, we addressed, or sought to address, these issues in the 6 January note. 

 

485.          Mr Campbell QC:  I asked you if you thought the Secretary of State had made up his mind in December.  You rather demurred from that, and you said that you thought not.

 

486.          Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

487.          Mr Campbell QC:  I wonder if you would look at this minute of 6 January, please.  Turn to page 2, which is SE/2/1311, then look at paragraph 6. 

 

488.          Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

489.  “In discussions with officials on 15 December the Secretary of State indicated that, on policy grounds, he favoured Holyrood among the new build options, provided no substantial unforeseen problems were discovered, and on balance he also favoured Holyrood over the St Andrew’s House option, again on policy grounds.  We have considered whether there are compelling arguments against selecting Holyrood, and also whether there are further arguments which might affect the balance as between Holyrood and St Andrew’s House.  We have concluded that there are no conclusive arguments against Holyrood which would lead us to recommend against the Secretary of State’s policy views.”

 

490.          Just asking the question again, do you think now, with hindsight and looking at that memo that he really made up his mind, in reality, by the middle of December?

 

491.          Mr Brown:  Well, “he favoured Holyrood”, it says here, and it mentions the other sites.  He favoured Holyrood among the three new-build options, and he favoured Holyrood over St Andrew’s House.  I do genuinely think that he had not made up his mind.  He was very open to us coming back to him and saying: “Look, sir, we have tried our best, but there is an insuperable traffic problem, or environmental problem, or ground condition problem at Holyrood”.  So, I think it would be going too far to say that he had made up his mind, but I think it would certainly be accurate — especially in the light of the paragraph you quote — to say that he favoured the Holyrood site.

 

492.          Mr Campbell QC:  To be completely fair with you, Mr Brown, you do say in the conclusion of this minute that he would be justified in choosing either, in your view.  Was that your genuine view at that time?  That is page SE/2/1313.

 

493.          Mr Brown:  Yes.  There would have been careful consideration of this, although at the end of the day, it is my advice and my responsibility.  It was clear to us that the Secretary of State had a genuine choice here.  Now, that includes issues about cost.  We felt that, despite the slight lead that Holyrood had in terms of costing on a 20-year discounted cash-flow basis, that that was not so blindingly obvious to be a compelling factor that had obliged the Secretary of State to choose Holyrood.  As I said, he would have been justified in choosing either. 

 

494.          Mr Campbell QC:  If you look back at SE/2/1079, which is Annex C to your minute of 12 December.

 

495.          Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

496.          Mr Campbell QC:  We see a figure of £49·5 million, which we have just discussed.  You told me that in the text, and also in Annex F, Queensberry House was added in.  Remember?

 

497.          Mr Brown:  Yes.  £49·5 million, yes.  Queensberry was another £4·4 million, I think, by implication, further down.

 

498.          Mr Campbell QC:  If we go to Annex B of this minute of 6 January, which is SE/2/1316, please.

 

499.          Mr Brown:  Yes.

 

500.          Mr Campbell QC:  We are looking at a rather less precise figure, a range of figures.

 

501.          Mr Brown:  We are looking at a range of £50 million to £55 million, instead of £49·5 million, yes.

 

502.          Mr Campbell QC:  £49·5 million and £4 million is £53·5 million — almost bang in the middle.  Was it necessary to be more precise than this, do you think, at this time?

 

503.          Mr Brown:  I think you are implying in what you are saying —

 

504.          Mr Campbell QC:  I am trying to be straightforward, Mr Brown.  If you do not understand the question, please tell me.

 

505.          Mr Brown:  Yes.  I think you are implying that the £50 million to £55 million includes the £4 million for Queensberry?

 

506.          Mr Campbell QC:  No,  I am not implying that at all.

 

507.          Mr Brown:  No?  No, you are not?

 

508.          Mr Campbell QC:  I was going to ask you — does it?

 

509.          Mr Brown:  The answer to that is that is does not, because note 1 to Annex B, at the bottom of this page, says that

 

510.  “costs of Queensberry House conversion not included”.

 

511.          And your follow-up question would be: “Well, why have you moved from £49·5 million — a spot figure drawn from the DLE cost report — to arrange a £50 million to £55 million?”  And I have thought about this question myself since I reviewed these papers in preparation for the Inquiry.  And so far I have not been able to come up with a satisfactory answer to that.

 

512.          Mr Campbell QC:  Could it have been something as honourable, but as imprecise, as simply trying to provide a small cushion?

 

513.          Mr Brown:  Yes.  I think that is the most likely explanation.

 

514.          Mr Campbell QC:  Sir, if that would be a convenient time, could I leave the matter there?  Thank you, Mr Brown, for what must have been a fairly gruelling day.  I am much obliged.  Thank you.

 

515.          Lord Fraser:  So, with regards to that last figure of between £50 million and £55 million, you just do not know why in a period of less than a month we have got an increase. Other than the explanation Mr Campbell has offered?

 

516.          Mr Brown:  Yes, and that is not factual.  I cannot provide you with documentary evidence for that, but the fact that I expressed it as a range, and the bottom end of the range was very close to the figure advised by DLE, makes me think that I was, as Mr Campbell said, just providing a bit of contingency, shall we say, in the capital cost figure. 

 

517.          Lord Fraser:  Mr Campbell, do you propose to cover the procurement issue with Mr Brown?

 

518.          Mr Campbell QC:  Well, I can go on if you wish, but…

 

519.          Lord Fraser:  It arises in 1998, does it not?

 

520.          Mr Campbell QC:  Yes 1998, and we have not got to the question of the designer competition yet.  Forgive me, Mr Brown, just a moment.  Sir, with respect, it is quite a big chapter and quite a difficult one, and I think, if I am asked for my view, I would have to say that it is something that is better taken when we are all a bit fresher, because the procurement issue is of importance. 

 

521.          Lord Fraser:  Well, I am afraid it looks as if, Mr Brown, you are going to have to return some time to give us your views on procurement.  As I understand it, you had some part to play in the decision with regard to the different models that might have been —

 

522.          Mr Brown:  Could I just offer a comment on that?  The lead on procurement issues, including making a decision on the procurement route to be taken, lay with Construction and Building Control Group, led by John Gibbons, and advised by Bill Armstrong, and no doubt with other input from experts within Construction and Building Control Group.  I was involved in that, as my witness statement to the Inquiry makes clear, but it was an early involvement, and in my clear recollection, it became a very tenuous involvement.  The witness who would give most information about that, I think, would be Dr Gibbons.

 

523.          Lord Fraser:  Well, we might try that.  If we can get a sufficiently clear understanding of the process that led to the decision, then it may be that we can avoid asking you to come back, but I think you had better continue to anticipate that we might require you to.

 

524.          Mr Brown:  Yes.  Sure.

 

525.          Lord Fraser:  Whether or not that is necessary, thank you very much for coming and giving your detailed evidence today.  Thank you.  OK, we will rise now.

 

526.          Mr Campbell QC:  Sir, the Inquiry is next programmed to sit on Wednesday 12 November, when it is proposed to take evidence from the Chief Executive of EDI Ltd, Mr Ian Wall, the former Lord Provost of Edinburgh, the Rt Hon Eric Milligan, and the City of Edinburgh Chief Executive, Mr Tom Aitchison, and his colleague Andrew Holmes, now the Director of City Development.  We should sit for three days next week, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. 

 

527.          Lord Fraser:  Thank you very much.

 

Hearing adjourned 4.11 pm.